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Acquisition and Forensic Analysis o f Volatile Data Stores

Timothy Vidas, MS

University o f Nebraska, 2006

Advisor: Kenneth Dick

The advent of more witted threats against typical computer systems demonstrates a need
for forensic analysis o f memory-resident data in addition to the conventional static
analysis common today.

Some tools are starting to become available to duplicate various types o f volatile data
stores. Once the data store has been duplicated, current forensic procedures have no
vector for extrapolating further information from the duplicate. This thesis is focused on
providing the groundwork for performing forensic investigations on the data that is
typically stored in a volatile data store, such as system RAM, while creating as small an
impact as possible to the state o f a system.

It is intended that this thesis will give insight to obtaining more post incident response
information along with a smaller impact to potential evidence when compared to typical
incident response procedures.
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Assumptions:
Only host based forensics are discussed in this thesis. Though interesting tangents may
be heavily related to the work shown here (such as the volatile stores of a network
switch) the omission of network based forensics is intended.

All of the samples and some of the text assumes standard Intel x86 32-bit architecture
and while many things may be similar, many alterations would likely have to be made for
64-bit platforms.

In most cases the term “non-volatile store” refers to a technology such a Hard Disk Drive
(HDD) which is assumed to retain data over extended periods of time with no power
applied to the device. Similarly, the term “volatile store” refers to a technology such a
Random Access Memory (RAM) which is assumed to not retain data over extended
periods of time with no power applied to the device. Various kinds of copies of these
types of stores my be referred to as duplicates, copies, or images.
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Disclaimer:
Techniques described here tend to follow a more historical thought process regarding
forensic procedures: acquire first, then identify. This may cause some privacy concerns
when contrasted with some more modem approaches to e-discovery1 where the pertinent
information is located first and then only that information is acquired. This distinction is
also pertinent when considering the classification of information. Traditionally acquired
data will need to be classified at the highest classification level of any information found
on the system. Theoretically, when using selective methods of e-discovery, the
acquisition could be limited to only acquire data of a certain classification level and thus
not be subjected to the high watermark. Both the historical and selective techniques have
their benefits and drawbacks; completeness versus speed and storage advantages
respectively. This text does not debate these techniques.

When copying Random Access Memory (RAM) from a live system the contents will
change as the copy is being created. This not only makes validation of the copy difficult,
but also questions the very terms used to describe this copy. Duplicate, Image and even
copy may not be the best suited terms, but are used here in the absence of a better term.

1 Guidance software has sections o f their website (www.guiadancesoftware.com) devoted to e-discovery
using their EnCase product line. Additionally there are many conference presentations and whitepapers on
the subject, but no traditionally academic sources, (e.g. CSI Annual Computer Security Conference,
CEIC, DoD Cyber Crime Conference)
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Definitions

%SystemRoot% : A Windows™ environmental variable is denoted by percent symbols

on either side. SystemRoot refers to the directory in which the OS is located in, typically
c :\windows or c :\winnt.

Binary: The low-level form of an application; it is typically executable, not readily
readable by a human, and not portable between platforms. Source Code is compiled in
order to create an executable binary.
Boot volume: The volume that contains the operating system and its support files. In
Windows, the boot volume can be, but does not have to be, the same as the system
volume.
Closed source: Closed source software is software for which the source code is not open
to public view. Under most licenses users cannot modify such software or redistribute it.
Typically this software is distributed in pre-compiled (binary) form.
Computer Forensics: The application of computer science to questions which are of
interest to the legal system
Digital Forensics: The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the
preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation,
documentation, and presentation of digital evidence derived from digital sources for the
purpose of facilitation or furthering the reconstruction of events which may be found to
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be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to
planned operations.
Driver : A device-specific program that enables a computer to work with a particular
piece of hardware, such as a printer, disk drive, or network adapter. Because the driver
handles device-specific features, the operating system is freed from the burden of having
to understand— and support—the needs of individual hardware devices.
Forensic Duplicate: Commonly described as a “bitsream” or “bit for bit” copy of a hard
disk. More accurately it is a sector by sector copy from source media. It is stored in a ’
‘raw’ unaltered form.
Forensics: The application of a science to questions which are of interest to the legal
system.
Image: As a noun, refers to some form of Forensic Duplicate. As a verb, refers to the
process of creating a Forensic Duplicate.
Incident Response: The practice of detecting a problem, determining its cause,
minimizing the damage it causes, resolving the problem, and documenting each step of
the response for future reference.
Kernel: The fundamental part of an operating system. It is a piece of software responsible
for providing secure access to the machine's hardware to various computer programs.
Since there are many programs, and access to the hardware is limited, the kernel is also
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responsible for deciding when and how long a program should be able to make use o f a
piece of hardware.
LiveCD: Operating System stored on a Bootable CL), it does not require a hard drive in
order to execute. A virtual disk is typically created in RAM in order to facilitate
programs that require a file system in order to operate.
Media Analysis: The use of procedures similar to those used in Computer or Digital
Forensics, but with no intent of involvement of a legal system.
Open Source: A movement in the programming community for making source code
(program instructions) free and freely available to anyone interested in using or working
with it. Such source code may be distributed only as uncompiled source, but in many
cases also includes compiled (binary) versions for ease of use by the end user.
Postmortem: Discussion of an event after it has occurred: literally, occurring after death.
Process: The state of a program when execution is actually occurring on a machine along
with the context required to execute.
Source Code: The human readable form of software. It is typically written in a highlevel language such as C++. Machines cannot readily execute code in this form; it must
first be converted to a low-level form, typically trough a process called compilation.
STOP code: The error code that identifies the error that stopped the system kernel from
running.
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System Volume: The volume that contains the hardware-specific files that are required to
load Windows. The system volume can be, but does not have to be, the same as the boot
volume. B o o t . i n i , N t d e t e c t .com, and N tbo o t d d .sys are examples of files that
are located on the system volume.
Thread: A processor activity in a process. The same process can have multiple threads.
Those threads share the process address space and can therefore share data.
Qualified Forensic Duplicate: Similar to a Forensic Duplicate, but stored in an altered
form (e.g. compressed) or with the addition of some metadata. The process can be
reversed or otherwise shown to accurately reflect the same data as a Forensic Duplicate.
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Abbreviations
ARP
BIOS
BSD
CD
CDROM

Address Resolution Protocol
Basic Input Output System
Berkeley Software Distribution
Compact Disk
Compact Disk (Read Only Media)

CPU
DD
ELF
EXE
GB

Central Processing Unit
Data Duplicator
Executable and Linking Format
Executable file (Windows)
Giga Byte

GNU
GPL
HDD
IBM
KB

GNU’s not Unix
GNU Public License
Hard Disk Drive
International Business Machines™
Kilobyte

KVM
LE
MB
MD5
NUCIA

Keyboard Video Mouse
Law Enforcement
Megabyte
Message Digest (version 5)
Nebraska University Consortium on Information Assurance

NX
OS
PAE
PCB
PDA

No eXecute
Operating System
Physical Address Extension
Process Control Block
Personal Digital Assistant

PDI
PDB
PEB
POFF
PTE

Page Directory Index
Page Directory Base
Process Environment Block
Page Offset
Page Table Entry

PTI
RAM
RFC
SID
SMSS

Page Table Index
Random Access Memory
Request For Comment
Security Identifier
Session Manager Subsystem
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SP
STEAL
TB
TLB
US

Service Pack
Security Technology Education and Analysis Laboratory
Terabyte
Translation Lookaside Buffer
United States

USB
VM
XD

Universal Serial Bus
Virtual Machine
eXecute Disabled
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The Forensic Process
The term forensics has many meanings. Alone, the word is defined by Merriam Webster
as “relating to or dealing with the application of scientific knowledge to legal problems”
(Forensic. Merriam-Webster). In the digital arena, however, many actions that bear
resemblance to procedures used in the forensic process (media analysis, data recovery,
event reconstruction and similar) are often billed as forensic services even though there is
never any intention of applying the science to a legal problem. When computer science is
applied to a legal process it is known as Computer Forensics (or depending on context,
Cyber Forensics or Digital Forensics).
Whereas computer forensics is defined as “the collection of techniques
and tools used to find evidence in a computer”, digital forensics has been
defined as “the use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward
the preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis,
interpretation, documentation, and presentation of digital evidence derived
from digital sources for the purpose of facilitation or furthering the
reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate
unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations” (Reith,
Carr, Gunsch. 2002.)
The basis of these steps traditionally revolve around preserving a state of a computer
system for subsequent analysis and reporting. This analysis is commonly performed in
parallel by more than one party, such as two sides in a legal dispute, and care must be

taken to ensure that all parties involved are working with identical data. Nearly identical

15

or similar data is insufficient. It has been shown that even when working with large sets
o f data, minute a discrepancy can have profound effect". As such, concepts such as
chain-of-custody borrowed from
Law
Enforcement

other disciplines arc often

.« Courts

adapted to digital forensics.
Even so, the Digital Forensics
Research W orkshop (DFRWS)

Dicjitai
Information

Forensic
Research

Critical
Infrastructure

Protection

uses the Venn diagram shown in
Figure 1 (Marc Rodgers, 2004)
to demonstrate three distinct

Military Operations

usiness and
Industry

Figure 1: Digital Forensics Communities

communities o f digital forensics. Only one community regularly deals with legal process
in the course o f performing digital forensics. It has been suggested (Rodgers. 2004,
among others) that academia be added as a fourth community, further minimizing the
root meaning o f forensics.

An example o f a minute discrepancy having a profound effect is a single ASCII character (likely 8 bits)
found in a document on a 80 gigabyte hard drive, becoming the deciding factor o f a multimillion dollar
settlement (about I / 85,000.000.000th o f the total data). (Taub. 2006)
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Background
In the not-too-distant past, a common incident response step taken early in the process
was to ‘pull the plug’ on a powered on machine (United States Secret Service, 2002).
Investigators knew that performing a ‘clean’ shutdown could further change the state of
the system. However ‘pulling the plug’ also has its own drawbacks to later analysis. One
such drawback is the lack of ability to identity and examine the state of the machine at
the time o f seizure.

•2

Some tools allow the acquisition of the contents of ‘raw ’ RAM from a running system.
Thus far, the analysis of a RAM image has been limited to small special-use devices such
as Palm PDAs or various cellular phones. For most forensic cases seen today, traditional
post-mortem techniques are sufficient for the United States court process, but for cases
involving an active adversary or completely memory resident threat (such as some
viruses and worms), analysis of volatile data stores will not only be recommended, but
will be required.

Many times the state of the non-volatile devices, such as hard disks, depend upon the
state of a volatile device, such as RAM. This is the case with many forms of Hard Disk
Drive encryption, where if a disk is powered down a secondary connection to the device

3 Helix Live CD - Incident Response Toolkit http://www.e-fense.com/helix/
Paraban’s Cell Seizure http://www.paraben-forensics.com/cell_m odels.html, etc.
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may prove fruitless.4 In certain cases a multi-partite memory resident virus5 can even
partially encrypt portions of a drive without the consent (or knowledge) of the user. In
such a case, capturing and analyzing the contents of memory would be required for an
investigation.

Virtual Addressing and Paging
In order to allow each process to have a logically contiguous address space and preserve
the efficiency of not having to allocate contiguous memory addresses to each process,
most modem OS memory management systems employ virtual addressing. In this type
of addressing, processes are given virtual addresses for memory which are then translated
to the correct physical address by the memory management system. This should not be
confused with Windows Virtual Memory which enables a process to use more memory
than physically available by swapping portions of memory to a secondary store such as a
file on disk. In fact, in Windows, all OS instances are given a virtual address space of
4GB regardless of physical RAM installed. This 4GB virtual range is typically divided
into two 2 GB sections6 —one for the OS and one for private application space. In this
sense “RAM is a limited resource, whereas virtual memory is, for most practical
purposes, unlimited.” (KB 555223).

4 It is very common in typical procedures to power off a system, then attach a write-blocking device to the
HDD before connecting it to some other device independent o f the original suspect hardware for
acquisition purposes.
5 ONE-HALF virus http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/Print98226.htm
6 Baring some boot switches such as /3G B.
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When memory use exceeds the available RAM, portions of memory are typically paged
.
.
.
7
(or copied) out to disk. In Windows this is done in 4 KB pages to files called the

Pageflle (pagefile.sys). When data in a particular page is needed for processing the page
is paged back into RAM and another page copied to the pageflle. For the purpose of this
thesis, concepts such as reserving, locking, sharing and committing pages, will not be
o

discussed, nor will the application of rights to pages via hardware memory protection .
Virtual Address

Page Directory Index

Page Directory

Page Table Index

Page Table

Byte Offset

Page

Physical Memory

Byte

PDI Entry

PTI Entry

Page

Figure 2: Virtual Address Translation

A memory manager generally constructs page tables to facilitate the translation of an
object at a virtual address referenced in a process to the physical hardware location of
that object. Each virtual address has an associated Page Table Entry (PTE) in the table

7 In X86 without the PAE switch enabled. For x64 and IA64 page size will range from 4 KB to 16 MB.
The cost vs benefit is typically related to Translation Look Aside Buffer (TLB) efficiency in hardware and
will not be discussed further here.
8 Since the page is the smallest granularity assignable via hardware memory protection, some concepts have
been getting attention again lately such as AM D’s NX bit or Intel’s XD bit (bit 63 o f the page table entry).
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which contains the physical address. In the Intel x86 architecture, a Page Directory Index
(PDI) also exists in order to locate the correct Page Table in which a PTE exists. When a
process requires access to a byte at a given virtual address (also see Figure 2: Virtual
Address Translation):
•

the PDI is referenced to locate the correct page table

•

the corresponding PTE found in the page table for the page that contains
the byte in question, contains the physical location of the page in RAM

•

finally an offset into the page is used to locate the actual physical byte

An example of decoding a virtual address can be found in Appendix E: Decoding a
Process Owner. It is important to note that each Windows process has a single page
directory with 1024 entries, and up to 512 page tables, each with 1024 entries. Paging is
typically enabled very early in the boot process, and applications benefit from virtual
memory / paging without any alteration because it is provided by the OS, essentially at a
lower layer than the process.

Ringed Architecture
Rings (aka protection rings, processor modes, process privilege mode), are provided by
many processors to allow “memory access protection from two levels (user and kernel).”
(Hennessy, Patterson. 2003). A system requires at least two protection levels to provide
privilege isolation between processes, which becomes a foundational requirement to
provide notionally higher concepts such as file confidentiality (Ware. 1970). Kernel (or
supervisor) mode allows access to all CPU functionality while the non-kernel modes
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(typically only one: user mode) allow restricted access. If the architecture allows more
than two modes, and the modes are implemented in a singular hierarchy, the architecture
is ringed; if the architecture provides only two modes, it can be thought of as a 2-ring
architecture. Generally, processes that exist in rings ‘further away’ from the kernel mode
(typically increasing in number) the functionality available to the process in that ring is a
subset of the prior ring.9 Most popular processors support a certain number of rings (Intel
x86 supports 4), however most operating systems only implement two rings for kernel
and user modes (typically at ring 0 and 3 respectively) and provide further protection
granularity through OS features instead of rings. This distinction between the two rings
is important to note for a variety of reasons, among them are the following. Processes in
ring 3 may not be able to access data in ring 0 and this may hinder the acquisition
process. Similarly rogue processes in ring 0 may not be detectable by processes in ring 3.
Among other examples, this distinction between the two rings can make kernel level
rootkits difficult to detect and/or remove. (Hoglund, Butler. 2006)

Processes and Threads
A process is the state of a program when execution is actually occurring on a machine
along with the context required to execute: current values of the program counter,
registers and variables. (Tanenbaum, 1997) A Windows process consists of a private
virtual address space, the actual executable code, a list of open file handles, a certain
9 Correct implementation o f a ringed architecture requires both hardware and software (OS) support. The
concept o f ringed architecture has existed for quite some time. The Multics project supported ringed
architecture circa 1963 (Corbato, Vyssotsky. 1965).
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security context, an ID, and at least one thread. (Russinovich, 2005). It is important to
note that even in the absence o f a multithreaded program, or even the possibility of
allowing multiple threads, every process has at least one thread. Only a thread can
execute, which counters popular terminology related to “running processes.”

Many processes are deemed default, and some are deemed required by various sources.
Default processes are those that start with the booting of a typical installation o f an OS.
Required processes are those that are required for the OS to function. Processes may
have familiar relationships such as parent and child, where the parent process starts the
child process and so on. Most operating systems are distributed with applications that
facilitate viewing the state o f currently running processes such as the Windows Task
Manager or the Linux p s or to p commands. Using these tools, different information
about the processes may be studied. The internal structure of a process and its respective
thread(s)10 are paramount to the analysis portion of this text and a more detailed summary
of related data structures will be presented there.

Objectives
The goal of this work is to assess the current methods and mechanisms available to
duplicate volatile data stores and more so, to analyze the effects these tools have on the
state of the system in which these stores exist. Some (most, all?) tools will actually alter

10 It is important to point out that this thesis only refers to “full” threads and not “lightweight” threads or
fibers which are scheduled internal to a process and not by the OS scheduling routine. These are obviously
very specific to each application and are not discussed here.

the state o f the system in question which is not recommended from a forensic point of
view. Altering the state of the system is akin to modifying a physical crime scene, the
evidence may not be altered, but there is no way to know after the modification has
occurred. The goal o f the media analyst is often to glean as much information as possible
directly from the evidence; the goal of a party involved with a legal system may fail more
in line with concepts such as burden of proof which allows for inference in many
situations.

In physical forensics, malfeasance or misconduct that changes the state o f a crime scene
could quite likely render evidence unusable in the court system. Digitally, the court is
taking a similar approach, however the circumstances are not equivalent. For example: if
a murder has occurred in a kitchen, and the murder weapon was left at the scene, if the
kitchen is sealed and guarded the murder weapon will still exist at a later point in time. If
a computer crime is observed, evidence might well be lost over time due to the normal
operation o f a computer system. Different, common actions on an individual system such
as scanning, paging, defragmenting, and re-allocation o f clusters/blocks can all alter or
overwrite potential evidence on disk. These actions (and others that do not necessarily
affect the disk) may start new processes and utilize portions o f memory which may alter
or overwrite potential evidence in RAM. The problem o f lost potential evidence may
even be compounded by common circumstances like the active participation of the
system in question on a network. Generally, the more active a system the more likely it
is that potential evidence will be lost.
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Regardless of the effectiveness of the methods and mechanisms used for acquisition,
procedures will be created to perform incident response and media analysis akin to those
in use today for traditional media. This thesis focuses on the analysis of the different
portions of RAM used by mainstream operating systems in order to adapt current
response methodologies to farther preserve the state of a suspect system. It is intended
that the effect of current incident response procedures on a suspect system be lessened
and the amount of information available after the initial response be equal to or greater
than the information obtained using current procedures.

Scripts developed to aid in the analysis o f an acquired image of a volatile data store are
distributed open source as Appendix G: Proof of Concept Source Code Listing to this
thesis under the GNU General Public License ( Appendix J: GNU General Public
License) for public use. However, the scripts are not the primary focus here.

The analysis of volatile stores and traditional postmortem forensics vary greatly.
Traditional forensics typically involves the postmortem media analysis o f a file system.
Though it is common to speak of analyzing a particular workstation or personal
computer, the analysis is very often only performed on a file system. Even ‘advanced
techniques’ focus on clarifying or adding to the file system that is being examined.
Popular industry products can perform automated actions such as recovering folders,
finding partitions, undeleting items, etc. All of these actions work toward the goal of
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having an “evidence container” (a “pseudo” file system) in which to perform analysis.
All further analysis is done within this container. Consider a word processor document
that contains an embedded digital picture. Contemporary tools may allow an analyst to
quickly view all digital pictures, including the embedded picture. This picture does not in
itself exist as a file, but as a portion of a file; however the picture by itself may be
considered as evidence. Even the misnomer “bit-for-bit” duplicates of hard disks11 are
parsed and data that was not contained within the suspect file system on the original disk
is added to the container in the analysis software (such as deleted files). Thus traditional
analysis depends very heavily on the understanding of the file system that was used on
the original system, and the file system is the primary focus of analysis.

Volatile data stores typically have no file system abstraction layer and the data within is
managed directly by the Operating System. For this reason, tools that focus on the
analysis of file systems are not able to cope with volatile stores well. When considering a
volatile data store such as Random Access Memory (RAM), other factors become main
focuses: the Operating System in use, the configuration of that Operating System and
possibly other information such as hardware implementation.

Particular instances of volatile stores will typically vary much more than instances of
non-volatile stores. This variance is partly due to the changing nature of volatile stores

11 Most duplicates that are represented as bit-for-bit or byte-for-byte duplicates are actually sector-by-sector
duplicates as the hard disk controllers on modem hard disk drives typically are only capable o f providing
data at a sector granularity

25

like RAM, which is perceived as a faster, more valuable resource than a non-volatile
store to the system and is thus always in contention. Contrary to popular belief, data may
still exist in a volatile data store from a time prior to the last reboot of the system (which
actually challenges the term ‘volatile’). While most hardware is capable of “zero-ing” or
otherwise clearing the contents of RAM at boot, many systems ship with the default
setting to “quick” mode where no memory testing or clearing is performed at all. It
should be pointed out that this capability is usually presented at a level much lower than
the operating system, typically as a BIOS feature.

Much information either required for or beneficial to the analysis of volatile stores will
likely only be attainable from the non-volatile stores. While many configuration settings
are standard, there is no technical OS control preventing something like a non-standard
page size. In some cases, changing these settings may actually be recommended 12
(Marxmeir, 2001). Data structures and memory mapping often differ between different
releases of software. Therefore obtaining information from a non-volatile store from the
suspect system version (like the version of OS from the hard disk) can be quite beneficial
for the analysis of the volatile store (such as parsing processes from data structures in
RAM. Cisco’s IOS router software alters the mapping of memory in every software
release (Lynn, 2005).

u While this reference does not speak directly to the topic at hand, “.. .the file system block size could have
a big impact on the system performance...” as related to databases. A search the a field o f choice should
find many articles both by vendors and end users relating storage unit sizes o f all kinds to system
performance. Page size can also be quite a bit different in non x86 architectures.
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Only recently has the capture of certain non-volatile stores become automated enough to
have the potential to be a common incident response action (Helix Version 1.4, 2004). A
few contemporary tools have built-in functionality for imaging RAM, however, once
captured, the customary analysis of this image is done manually using a hexadecimal
editor/viewer and possibly some slightly more helpful, yet still primarily crude
techniques such as performing a strings analysis. The problems are in the tools and
techniques provided to the typical forensic analyst, and their focus on non-volatile stores.

This does not even touch on the present-day debate on whether is advisable to alter the
state of a currently powered on system in exchange for obtaining more information.
Historically, a first responder was trained to “pull the plug” if a suspect machine was
discovered in a powered on state13 (United States Secret Service, 2002). This typically
does guarantee ‘more’ information to be available on the non-volatile stores because the
system has not had the chance to perform any shutdown tasks. For example, an operating
system may clear a paging file, or delete temporary files at shutdown. However, this
approach will have marginal success at showing the entire state of the system at the point
that the power was removed because the OS has not been given the opportunity to
perform shutdown tasks.

Many texts have proposed that incident response should observe an order of volatility,
such as processing stores in a particular order: registers, routing information, process
13 . .if a specialist is not available.. .disconnect all power sources; unplug from wall and the back o f the
computer.” This verbiage is from the US Secret Service, but the action is not atypical.

27

table, temporary files, physical disk (Brezinski, Killalea. 2002). Each type o f store
respectively becomes less volatile and more persistent as the process goes on, and in fact
some first responder checklists may employ executing certain commands or scripts
before removing power from a system. These procedures may include running
commands to obtain information about the state of the system, such as process lists,
network connection status, open files, etc. The perceived primary problem with this
procedure is that potential evidence is being altered; many incident response guides do
not even take this'state alteration into account (Baker, 2005 among others). Simply
performing the response procedures introduces more processes in the process table of the
machine. O f course, these processes will be bound to the access level that they run
under. Not having administrator level access at incident response time, or the presence of
a rootkit or other subversion technique may render these actions fruitless anyway. The
order in which to process the stores becomes more complex when general assumptions do
not hold, such as the persistence of data in memory between reboots, or the persistence of
data in memory for extended periods of time (Chow. 2005).

A secondary problem with interacting with the machine at incident response time is a
trust issue in using commands from a suspect machine. Techniques commonly used in
malware like rootkits and spyware (binary byte patching, application replacement, system
call hooking, etc) can alter the output of commands and applications in ways that make
the detection of the alteration difficult. Commands may be issued from a more trusted
media, such as a CDROM, but in some cases even these perceived to be trusted, read-
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only binaries can be subverted14. Due to scalability issues, this type of subversion
technique is likely to only take the most popular response tools into account.

Related to the act of adding a process to the process table, and the argument of cost
versus the benefit of doing so, is the concept of information longevity, f or example in
most file systems when a file is deleted15, typically the allocation units for the file are
marked as available for use and the contents of these units are not cleared. While the
block may appear as empty or inaccessible from a file system or operating system point
of view, the data has not been cleared and can be accessed by alternate means. This is a
primary method of data recovery for a variety of forensic tools. Similar in concept to the
example of the extended longevity of a file, all objects have lifetimes. Memory contents
may change more often given an active user or active processes, but this depends on the
amount of memory, the existence of some sort o f paging file and a number of other
factors.

Even if certain procedures are followed in the incident response process before the power
is removed, some valuable information might not be obtained. Two primary examples are

14 Some particular types o f rootkits, such as hacker defender, actually attempt to sense popular rootkit
detection techniques in order to avoid detection.“To overcome some o f the countermeasures implemented
by Holy Father and other rootkit authors, the latest version creates a randomly named copy o f itself that
runs as a Windows service. This approach is effective, but Russinovich and Cogswell acknowledge, "It is
theoretically possible for a rootkit to hide from Rootkit Revealer. However, this would require a level o f
sophistication not seen in rootkits to date” (Dillard, 2005)
15 Deleted from the filesystem, not from the Operating System. Deleted in this context, typically means
that the OS is not capable o f recovering the information. When using a recycle bin model, a file is not
deleted until it has been removed from the recycle bin.
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purely memory resident malware16 and encryption keys stored in memory. Some tools
like The Metasploit Project may use techniques like direct memory injection to load OS
modules without leaving any evidence on the disk.

The main purpose of analyzing volatile data stores is to reduce the impact the investigator
subjects upon potential evidence while increasing the amount and credibility of the
evidence that is acquired. Even so, it is important to point out that in some instances
even the acquisition process can be subverted. Situations such as the examination of a
system that has a rootkit present create further challenges for the investigator. Even in
such a situation, the availability of RAM contents at the time of power removal (and a
forensic duplicate of the physical drive) would likely be beneficial to an investigator,
even if the RAM was incomplete. A greater difficulty lies in the potential ability of an
untrustable system to wholly deny access to data stores.

Typical incident response consists of running a series of commands - each starting its
own process, the output of which is stored on a secondary device so as to not potentially
overwrite data on the disk. Each command will result in creating at least one new
process which may overwrite latent data in RAM much like creating a new file may
overwrite latent data on disk. A contemporary listing of typical incident response steps
can be found in Table 1: Common Incident Response Steps.

16 Worms, Virii, Trojans, rootkits, spyware and the like. Examples would be Nimda or SQL slammer.
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Table 1: Common Incident Response Steps

System Profile

Date and Time
uptime
Runing Processes
Open Files, startup,
clipboard
Users
Network information

(Nolan, O ’Sullivan, Branson, Waits)
Linux
Windows
systeminfo.exe, psinfo
/proc (version, uptime,
meminfo, filesystems,
cpuinfo), uname
netstat, date
netstat, date, time
psuptime, net statistics
uptime, w
netstat, pulist, tlist, pslist,
ps, w, top, fuser,
modules.conf, ldd, Is
listdlls
dir, afind, macmatch,
Is, find, lsof, file, /etc/rc*
autoruns, handle, pclip
directories, chkconfig,
inittab, cron, at
net users, psloggedon,
who, last, lastlog,
ntlast, dumpusers
/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow
ipconfig, fport, psservice,
ifconfig, netstat,
promiscdetect, netstat,
/var/log/messages, arp
nbstat, net, arp

There are still other areas that blur the line between the analysis of a static store and a
volatile store. Swap space, for example, resides on disk either in an allocated form (such
as a pagefile in Windows) or somewhat more raw form (such as a swap partition in
Linux). Upon removal of power from a system, swap space may still exist largely
11
intact . However, the analysis of such space will be similar to the raw analysis
techniques presented here and less similar to traditional techniques related to forensic
procedures applied to a typical file system. Traditional techniques may allow the
detection or recovery of the pagefile from the file system, but the interpretation of the
contents will be much more analogous to RAM analysis than file analysis. Furthermore,
the availability of both swap information as well as an image of the RAM will allow
17 Largely is a subjective term and no assumptions are made as to the exact or expected percentage o f intact
swap information. Each system will have different results. In fact each system will even show different
results on subsequent experiments. The data that will remain past the removal o f power will depend greatly
on the state and configuration o f the system.
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some comparison. Obviously the level of comparison that can be made will depend
entirely on the system in question due to the aforementioned state of swap information.

Memory Acquisition
Generally speaking, data stored in a volatile data store is, as the name implies, volatile in
nature. Introductory level students of computer science are taught early in their education
that the difference between a hard disk technology and RAM technology is that the data
in RAM is lost when power is removed from the system. This theory also falls in line
with current movements in the Law Enforcement sector, and is fundamental to the need
presented in this thesis for adaptation of current incident response processes. However, it
has recently been proven that at least some hardware retains data in RAM for certain
periods of time. For example, an IBM T30 Thinkpad laptop may retain RAM contents
for as long as 30 seconds without power (Chow, Pfaff, Garfinkel, Rosenblum. 2005).
Similarly, samples taken as part of this research also clearly show that RAM data
survives reboots.

Without a specialized hardware tool designed to rapidly copy data from the RAM
immediately after power down, or designed to clamp on to the memory stores of a
running machine and duplicate in stream18, the examiner must resort to using provided
methods to access volatile stores. These methods may be provided at different levels of
abstraction and likewise offer different granularities and insight into the data present.
18 Such as the PCI described in A Hardware Based Memory Acquisition Procedure for Digital
Investigations (Carrier, Grand).
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For recovery and testing purposes, many versions of Windows can be configured to
perform a memory dump upon system crash, called a crash dump. This functionality is
typically dictated graphically by choosing the “Startup and Recovery” button under the
“Advanced la b ” of “My Computer” properties page. The “Write debugging
information” field can be set to Complete, Kernel, or Small style memory dumps. These
settings can also be manipulated using the Windows registry:

H K E Y _ L O C A L _ M A C H I N E \S y s te m \C u r r e n tC o n t r o lS e t\C o n tr o l\C r a s h C o n tr o l

None
= Complete memory dump
= Kernel memory dump
= Small memory dump (64KB)

C r a s h D u m p E n a b le d REG_DWORD 0 x 0 =
C r a s h D u m p E n a b le d REG_DWORD 0 x 1
C r a s h D u m p E n a b le d REG_DWORD 0 x 2
C r a s h D u m p E n a b le d REG_DWORD 0 x 3

Related keys of interest are:
A u t o R e b o o t REG_DWORD 0 x 1
D u m p F i le REG_EXPAND_SZ % S y s te m R o o t% \M e m o r y . dmp
M in i d u m p D i r REG_EXPAND_SZ % S y s te m R o o t% \M in id u m p

Complete memory dumps include the entire contents of physical memory and are by
default eventually saved to %S y s t e m R o o t %\ M e m o r y . dmp (see page 35 for more
details). Complete memory dumps will require a swap file larger than the physical RAM
size of the machine plus 1 MB (to allow the addition of a file header and some kernel
variable values)19. In situations involving ‘large’ amound of RAM, special
considerations must be taken. There are several workarounds requiring registry, and boot

19 An entire megabyte is not required, but the smallest increment o f the Windows paging system is 1 MB.
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modifications to allow complete memory dumps for Windows 2000 based systems with
more than 2 GB of RAM. Complete memory dumps are not possible with Windows
2000 based systems using Physical Address Extension or with more than 4 GB o f RAM
(due to the page file size limitation of 4095 MB and the complete memory dump size for
4 GB of RAM to be 4096 + 1 MB). Many administrators might readily point out that it is
possible to have more than 4095 MB of paging space. While this is true, it is achieved
through multiple page files and 4095 MB is the maximum size for each individual file.
Table 2: : Windows pagefile sizing by Architecture

x64

x86
Maximum size of a paging
file
Maximum number of paging
files
Total paging file size

IA-64

4 GB

16 TB

32 TB

16

16

16

64 GB

256 TB

512 TB

Table 3: Maximum RAM support by OS20

OS Version
Windows
Windows
Windows
Windows
Windows
Windows
Windows
Windows
Windows
Windows

NT
2000 Professional
2000 Standard Server
2000 Advanced Server
2000 Datacenter Server
XP Professional
Server 2003 Web Edition
Server 2003 Standard Edition
Server 2003 Enterprise Edition
Server 2003 Datacenter Edition

Maximum
RAM (GB)
4
4
4
8
32
4
2
4
32
64

A kernel memory dump only dumps memory pertaining to kernel level processes. Kernel
memory dumps require the primary volume’s pagefile to be at least approximately 1/3 of
20 All Windows limits pertain to x86 32 bit architecture not observing /3G, /AWE or /USERAV boot
switches. Some such as 64 bit, Server 2003 with Service Pack 1 can support up to 1024 GB o f RAM.
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the system’s physical RAM. This type of dump differs from a complete dump in that
only kernel level processes (the OS kernel, device drivers, and system level programs, but
NOT user programs or unallocated memory) and is thus much faster and space efficient,
but contains less information. The

% S y s te m R o o t% \M e m o r y . dmp

for kernel memory dumps. Each time a STOP error occurs, the

location is also used

M e m o r y . dmp

file is

replaced with a new version pertaining to the most recent crash. This replacement and
thus loss of prior information affects both complete and kernel memory dump types.

Small memory dumps (aka minidumps) are, as the name implies, much smaller - 64 KB
in 32-bit systems. Minidumps only require 2 MB of page file space, and instead of
including full contents of RAM or kernel allocated RAM, minidumps include at a
minimum the STOP message, a list of drivers, processor context, process and thread
context, and a kernel mode call stack. Minidumps are saved as individual files in the
%SystemRoot%\minidump directory and are named according the date on which the
error occurred (for example,

M i n i 0 7 0 5 0 6 - 0 1 . dmp

for the first minidump on July 05,

2006).

The facts that subsequent minidumps do not overwrite previous minidumps, and that
minidumps are relatively small make this type of dump desirable to administrators.
However, the lack of RAM data makes the minidump type of memory dump less
desireable for the analysis techniques described in this thesis (though the existence of
information in the minidumps may still hold valuable forensic information). If minidump

35

style dumps are the only type o f dump available, some simple information may be
discerned. Access to core binaries (such as ntoskemel.exe) from the suspect system and
possibly access to symbols
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for the examined version o f Windows may allow additional

interpretation o f the information in a minidump, but it will pale in comparison to the
information attainable from a larger memory dump.

Client platform Windows operating systems default to minidump style, and server
platform Windows operating systems default to complete style dumps. On XP and 2003
Server platforms minidumps are created in addition to the complete or kernel dump. If a
complete or kernel dump file is available, a minidump can be created from that complete
or kernel dump using . dump /m in WinDbg.

All memory dumps, regardless o f source (crash induced or somehow instantiated) require
space for storage. In the most raw form, a total image of RAM would require at least the
same space as the physical RAM (1 MB if in the Microsoft DMP format). Since this data
is eventually written to disk, the possibility exists that less volatile evidence stored on
disk will be over-written. If possible, the RAM could be saved to a non-suspect device
(e.g. a tape drive). If not possible, the perceived benefit o f saving-system RAM must be
weighed against the possibility o f overwriting potential evidence.

2'Symbols are basically a way to give more information to a debugging tool, like function and variable
names, that would not normally be available in a complied version o f software. Further information on
symbols appears later.
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When a memory dump is forced by a crash, the Windows kernel actually loads a miniport
driver to write the dump contents directly to sectors that are occupied by the pagefile.
Because of this, contents of the pagefile will contain a DMP formatted file structure that
can be later extracted using forensically sound procedures if power is removed from the
system after the dump has completed but before the operating system has been reloaded.

The

M e m o r y . dmp

file in the

% S y stem R o o t%

directory is not created until after the
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system reboots . After the operating system has started to reload, the Session Manager
Subsystem (SMSS) user process enables paging upon boot. If SMSS determines a DMP
memory dump is found in the pagefile, SMSS instructs the kernel to mark the parts of the
pagefile occupied by a DMP as unusable. Later in the boot process, WinLogon checks
for DMP memory dump data in the pagefile. If found WinLogon spawns Savedump to
extract the file and store it the

% S y stem R o o t% .

In situations involving large quantities

of RAM this detection and copy can significantly slow down the boot process following a
crash dump. Because o f this, when using the Windows crash dump method o f obtaining
a memory dump, a RAM to pagefile comparison will not be possible. The automatic
creation o f a minidump from the complete memory dump happens after the system has
finished rebooting. It is important to note that even though the

m em ory

. dmp

file is not

created until after the system reboots, the information is actually written to disk. If a

22 This is very easy to observe. Simply follow the MS instructions, as outlined in this thesis to setup a test
machine for a “Full Memory Dump” then use one o f the techniques presented to initiate a crash dump.
Instead o f allowing the machine to reboot to the OS, reboot using a LiveCD. Browsing the file system will
show that MEMORY.DMP does not yet exist, even though the physical memory was written to disk (as
evidenced by the blue screen after the crash). Upon rebooting into the OS the MEMORY. DMP file will be
created.
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system crash occurs (or is forced), it is preferred to not let the system reboot which would
cause multiple changes to occur to the suspect non-volatile stores. Not only would this
reboot alter expected things like OS timestamps, but also overwrite a large amount of
unallocated space with the newly created m e m o r y

. dmp

file.

The DMP format is a proprietary Microsoft file type, but the structure of the additional
information present in a DMP file is easily discerned through the use of tools provided by
Microsoft. The DMP header is commonly stated to have 1MB for header information
Figure 3: DMP File Header
Offset

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

A

B

C

D

E

F

00000000

50 41 47 45 44 55 4D 50

OF 00 00 00 93 08 00 00

PAGEDUMP

00000010

00 00 03 00 00 20 0D 82

F0 D9 46 80 B0 DC 46 80

.......,<3UF€°UF€

00000020

4C 01 00 00 01 00 00 00

E2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

L .......a .......

00000030

00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00 00 00 00 00 41 47 45

............. AGE

00000040

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

PAGE PAGEPAGE PAGE

00000050

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

50 41 47 45 00 41 47 45

PAGEPAGEPAGE.AGE

00000060

58 F3 46 80 04 00 00 00

8C FE 01 00 01 00 00 00

X o F € . . . .(Efc>.....

00000070

IF 00 00 00 21 00 00 00

7E 00 00 00 00 01 00 00

00000080

FF 0E 00 00 00 10 00 00

F0 EE 01 00 50 41 47 45

y ....... 6 1 . . PAGE

00000090

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

PAGE PAGE PAGE PAGE

000000A0

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

PAGE PAGE PAGE PAGE

0 0 0 0 0 0B0

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

PAGE PAGE PAGE PAGE

00000F70

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

50 41, 47 45 50 41 47 45

PAGE PAGE PAGE PAGE

00000F80

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

01 00 00 00 50 41 47 45

PA G E P A G E .... PAGE

00000F90

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45

PAGE PAGE PAG E PAGE

i

~
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(Russinovich, 2005)(KB 309773), but for the purpose o f this thesis only the first 4KB is
useful. From this first 4 KB extra metadata can be discerned (e.g. Version and Build of
the Windows OS that created the dump, the number of CPUs, the system architecture,
and the type of dump created (kernel or complete)). Some of this information is in
addition to what can be detected from the memory image, while other parts o f this
information can be used to validate the results. At the very least the presence of the
header allows the program itself to adjust the detection processes depending on input.
The indicated portions of Figure 3 show the file signature (0x5041474544554D50 —
“PAGEDUMP”), the “Major” OS version (OxFOOOOOO = 15), the “Minor” OS Build
number (0x93080000 = 2195 —Windows 2000), the architecture (0x0000014C = 338 —
i386), the number of processors (0x00000001 = 1) and the type of dmp file (0x00000001
= 1 —Complete [2 would be kernel]).

Tools distributed from Microsoft for debugging Windows-based software, such as the
I386kd tool23, the Userdump OEM tool, or similarly the crashdump utility built into the
kernel, create one of the proprietary “dmp” files designed to help discern the cause of
bugs and crashes. While these tools are not designed with forensics in mind, they can
still provide information from RAM. Most of the tools designed with debugging in mind
will write the volatile information to a non-volatile store, which is forensically poor since
the non-volatile store is usually also suspect, and this action could potentially overwrite
non-volatile evidence. A middle ground solution may be to introduce another storage

23 Found on the Windows 2000 Support CD-ROM
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location to accept the dump (e.g. a network share or portable storage device provided by
the investigator). Different techniques must be weighed against existing policy, and may
well depend on the circumstances o f the particular incident. Mapping drive letters to
network shares and introducing external devices (like USB hard drives) both have impact
on the system. The best case might be that the new hardware or shares will be
enumerated at various places on disk and thus the procedure must be documented by the
responder to avoid later misinterpretation by an analyst. The worst case might be
accidentally causing executables to be run (possibly via autorun) or even system failure.

Most kernel debugging tools, both Microsoft distributed and third party, require
installation and configuration. Some even require special connections and/or hardware.
Both installation of software and special connections to hardware may have unacceptable,
adverse impacts on the state o f the system. For this reason kernel debugging solutions
are often not a viable choice for most investigations. Some tools or portions of packages
are in a portable executable form and can be executed independent o f the debugging
installation. Such tools might become a valuable part o f a toolkit24 designed for the
initial incident response (first responder). Other tools such as dumpchk.exe which
verifies the correct creation of the memory dump might appear to be useful, but
dumpchk.exe only works on minidump files and provides no insight in the inspection of
complete or kernel memory dumps.

24 Different packages and toolkits have varying license agreements. It may not be within the rights o f the
purchaser to use these tools in this manner. Research done for the purpose o f this thesis was for proof o f
concept and education purposes only. Users must verify similar usage against respective license
agreements.
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Since Windows source code is not available to the typical developer, code level analysis
is not available when troubleshooting even the simplest kinds of errors. To aid the
debugging efforts of developers, Microsoft distributes what is known as “symbols” for
multiple versions of Windows. Symbols allow a debugger to correlate application
execution statements with function names, line numbers, etc. without the need for source
code. At compile time (actually linking) the compiler can create symbol information
along with the compiled executable. “Symbol files hold a variety o f data which are not
actually needed when running the binaries, but which could be very useful in the
debugging process. Typically, symbol files might contain: Global variables, Local
variables, Function names and the addresses of their entry points FPO data, and Sourceline numbers”(Microsoft Corp. 2006). The exclusion of this information in the compiled
binary is purposeful in order to create smaller, faster binaries. While possession of
symbols is not required to debug or reverse engineer a compiled product, it can greatly
reduce the complexity.

Obtaining live dumps of RAM can be problematic. In addition to altering the contents of
memory (no matter how slightly) by performing the dump, the memory will also be
changing as the system continues to run due to other running processes. This, paired with
the fact that it will take some time to actually obtain the dump, means that the resulting
dump will not actually reflect the state of RAM an exact point of time, but rather a time
sliding view of memory. Faster imaging will result in a smaller time window, and on all
but the most active systems RAM is unlikely to change substantially during the imaging
process, but the fact remains that it will change - it is just a question of how much.
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Actions similar to the some of the above kernel debugging techniques can be used on a
live system. Windbg’s .dump can be used in conjunction with Systintem ars Livekd in
order to create a dump of a running kernel

rye

(Russinovich, Solomon. 2005). Similar

results should be possible using more robust tools such as SoftlCL or IDAPro.

George Gamer’s dd modifications allow for the /Device/PhysicalMemory object to
be copied using the dd tool (used in many Open Source forensic packages, such as the
Helix LiveCD). Invoking the dd command is not much different in a Win32 environment
than in a Linux environment. The only part that might appear alien to one who has used
dd before is the input, which is an access method to the device “PhysicalMemory:”
■ dd i f = \ \ . \ D e v i c e \ P h y s i c a l M e m o r y o f= m e m o r y . b i n b s = 4 0 9 6

Using dd has many advantages, there is no need to install software, it has a small
executable size for lower impact and easy portability, a simple file structure, and is open
source. Because the file is stored in a “RAW” format, low level analysis is simple - file
offsets are the' same as memory offsets, however this can also be viewed as a negative
25 Live debugging is built into the windows debugger, but requires a secondary debug system to be attached
and the debug target must be booted with the /DEBUG switch. “Local” kernel debugging is possible with
XP / 2003 Server but does not allow the .dump and thus does not pertain to the debugging needs presented
here.
26 Notice the use o f the bs option for blocksize. This option should be set to 4096, the size o f a page.
The actual command used for the results presented in this text was:
dd i f = \ \ .\Device\PhysicalMemory o f = e :\memory\OSTYPE\OSTYPE.dd bs=4096
conv=noerror --md5sum --verifymd5 m d 5 f i l e = e :\memory\OSTYPE\OSTYPE.md5 -l o g=e:\memory\OSTYPE\audit.log

where OSTYPE was user supplied at the time and varied by OS used. E: mapped to an external USB mass
storage device.
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because this does not preserve the DMP file format in which Windows natively dumps,
and thus cannot be used with tools expecting DMP formatted files. This method also has
the advantage of operating similarly to a dd memory dump performed on a Linux system,
which gives the tool familiarly for the user across platforms. Unfortunately it appears
that this technique will not be particularly useful in the future. Microsoft has decided to
change the functionality of the
Usermode access to

\D e v ic e \P h y s ic a lM e m o r y

\D e v ic e \P h y s ic a lM e m o r y ,

object in Server 2003 SP1.

which is required for user level

program access such as the dd tool, is not permitted. Kemelmode access is still granted,
but this gives little peace of mind to the forensic investigator as kemelmode access would
require either installation of an imaging program or pre-meditated configuration, and
neither case is likely in most situations.

For the sake of completeness and for testing purposes it should be pointed out that
memory dumps can also be forced. For the purpose of incident response, many o f these
methods are not preferred because they typically either require pre-meditation or have an
impact to a non-volatile store that is unacceptable. These methods should still be of
interest to the incident responder, if for no other reason than that of tool validation.
Forcing memory dumps on known systems allows for the testing of tools that will be
used in the field, and repetitive, scheduled testing of software and hardware to validate
manufacturer claims should be an integrated part of operations. The aforementioned
kernel debugging tools can often be used to force a memory dump. Similarly, freely
distributed tools such as UserDump can dump the memory space of a single process, but
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this does not directly apply to the objectives set forth here and is only mentioned for the
sake of completeness.

For Windows 2000 based operating systems (2000, XP Pro, Server 2003 and variants)
there is actually a built in way to force a system crash, and thus a memory dump (KB
244139). A

REG_DWORD

named

C r a s h O n C tr lS c r o ll

with a value of l must be added

(or edited) to:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\i8 042prt\Parameters

This registry update requires a system restart. The keyboard driver will now have added
functionality. When the right Control key is held and Scroll Lock is pressed twice 27, the
crashdump utility will be executed and the infamous Windows Blue Screen will be
shown with a defined STOP code of

0 x 0 0 0 0 0 0E 2,

end-user generated crashdump. This

o f course requires that the system was configured to perform one of the three previously
mentioned types of crash dumps upon a system crash.

A fairly low-impact method developed by Mark Russinovich involves loading a small
driver ( -7 kb) called M

y F a u lt. s y s

and a user level application N o t M

y F a u lt. e x e (

—50 kb). The user executable issues calls to the kernel loaded driver which crashes the
system on behalf of the user level executable in various ways. This pair of files can force
a number of crash conditions in Windows and thus can force the creation of a memory
27 Due to the implementation o f this method in the i8042prt.sys driver, this method likely does not work on
USB keyboard. Similarly, if a virtual machine is used and the appropriate client tools are installed on the
virtual machine it is quite likely that the 18042prt.sys driver is replaced with a virtual machine variant that
does not exhibit this functionality. Also, many KVMs intercept scrlck pressed twice to provide a user
menu which may prevent the keycodes from actually reaching the system.
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dump if the machine is appropriately configured. The tool is interactive and will alter the
state of the suspect machine, but in the event that live imaging of RAM is not possible (as
seems to be the case with 2003 Server SP1) this may be a lesser impacting method of
obtaining system state information than interactively gathering information from the
running suspect machine.

Some memory dumps (crash dumps) can actually be interrupted by a BIOS level system
restart. For example, for some time some Compaq Server systems have had a high
availability feature that detects when a system stops responding and forces a system
reboot (AlphaServer Comparison Chart, December 1996). In such a situation where the
machine essentially causes a soft restart autonomously, the creation of a full memory
dump after a system crash will likely be interrupted. A likely course of action would be
to disable this feature in BIOS when the system restarts and use a very minimal LiveCD
to acquire memory in hope that some of the memory contents have persisted through the
reboot cycle. Unfortunately it is likely impossible to detect whether this feature is
enabled on a running machine prior to forcing the memory dump.

Memory Analysis
Having some information typically acquired using traditional non-volatile techniques, or
in some cases live response steps, may serve as an enabler for analysis on volatile data.
OS type and patch level are among the foremost important factors.
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Currently, after an incident, captured memory (if available) is analyzed using techniques
that would be considered crude if used for traditional file system level forensics. A
simple hex view or strings

analysis may be used by an investigator to simply glance at a

subset of data looking for something that might provide some direction. Experiments run
in conjunction with this project showed that, on average, a cleanly booted workstation
with 512 MB of RAM would produce 50-80 MB of largely unusable strings output.
Unusable does not suggest that a string such as “dollar” was found, but it was not
pertinent because this was not a counterfeiting suspect. Unusable means that, while
technically printable, most of the strings extracted have no inherent meaning, such as
“EWCcedh@”. The ratio of the amount of information obtained from the data is very
low. The situation is worse if only a hex view analysis is performed without the aid of the
strings tool.

Original Analysis Goals:
•

Must work on dd-style dumps (preferred, though not hopeful for the future due to
2003 spl) and on Microsoft DMP Complete style dumps.

•

Must be simple to use, since the target user base will typically be law
enforcement, not computer scientists.

•

Must accurately produce results that would have normally been obtained by
running commands during incident response, (for tool development it must
accurately re-produce a pre-response observed set of procesess)

28 Strings is a program developed for UNIX and ported to Windows that allows the extraction o f “printable
sequences o f characters” from a file - no matter what type o f file. It is commonly used on binary files to
aide in deductions to be made about the binary. (Strings Man Page)
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•

Must work on multiple versions o f Windows and Linux.

The Windows EPROCESS structure and significance
As previously stated, processes and threads are vital concepts required to be explored in
light of the objectives. Even though internal structures are by definition not known in
closed source products such as Windows, the EPROCESS structure can be enumerated
using a kernel debugger, (e.g. using the Windows debugger to enumerate fields by
issuing a !p

roccessf ie ld s ,

dt _ep rocess

or

d t n t !_ e p r o c e ss

command.)

Substructures can also be enumerated in this way. From the information gleamed from
the debugger (and available in Appendix B, C and D) a model for the EPROCESS and
subsequent structures can be created as seen in Table 4: EPROCESS Structure. Other
substructures such as the Kernel Process KPROCESS (Process Control Block - PCB) can
modeled similarly, and some EPROCESS elements, such as the Process Environment
Block (PEB), are pointers to data that exists elsewhere (See Appendix B: EPROCESS
dumps of a live typical system - XP SP2).
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Table 4: EPROCESS Structure

(Russinovich, Solomon. 2005)
EPROCESS Element
Purpose
Coimiiuii dispalcliei ubjecl header, pointer to Llie process
page directory, list of kernel thread (KTHREAD) blocks
Kernel process
(KPROCESS or PCB)
belonging to the process, default base priority, quantum,
block
affinity mask, and total kernel and user time for the
threads in the process.
Unique process ID, creating process ID, name of image
Process identification
being run, window station process is running on.
Limits on nonpaged pool, paged pool, and page file
usage plus current and peak process nonpaged and paged
pool usage. {Note: Several processes can share this
structure: all the system processes point to the single
Quota block
systemwide default quota block; all the processes in the
interactive session share a single quota block Winlogon
sets up.)
Virtual address space
Series of data structures that describe the status of the
descriptors (VADs)
portions of the address space that exist in the process.
Pointer to working set list (MMWSL structure); current,
peak, minimum, and maximum working set size; last
Working set information
trim time; page fault count; memory priority; outswap
flags; page fault history.
Current and peak virtual size, page file usage, hardware
Virtual memory information
page table entry for process page directory.
Interprocess communication channel to which the
Exception local procedure
process manager sends a message when one of the
call (LPC) port
process's threads causes an exception.
Interprocess communication channel to which the
Debugging LPC port
process manager sends a message when one of the
process's threads causes a debug event.
Access token
Executive object describing the security profile of this
(ACCESS TOKEN)
process.
Handle table
Address of per-process handle table.
Address of object directory to resolve device name
Device map
references in (supports multiple users).
Image information (base address, version numbers,
Process environment block
module list), process heap information, and thread-local
(PEB)
storage utilization. {Note: The pointers to the process
heaps start at the first byte after the PEB.)
Win32 subsystem process
Process details needed by the kemel-mode component of
the Win32 subsystem.
block (W32PROCESS)
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Certain parts of the EPROCESS structure stand out as being easily identifiable. Similar
to how deleted files and file remnants are found in unused portions of a file system or
disk device, it is possible to start to find EPROCESS structures by locating individual
portions of the structure and then testing other sections (by offset, since these can be
discerned from the structure dump) of the EPROCESS candidate for validity.

One part of the EPROCESS structure that is easy to identify with is the timestamp
9Q

information . While most readers will be familiar with the concept of a timestamp,
many may not be familiar with this particular implementation. FILETIME is a Windows
defined structure that has existed since Windows’3.1 but is also defined in the current
.NET framework 2.0. It is a 64 bit value that consists of two data members: the high
order 32 bits are dwHighDateTime and the low order 32 bits are dwLowDateTime. The
64 bits typically represent a number o f 100 nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601 .
Once the location of a FILETIME is known, some conversion must take place to make
this a usable timestamp for investigative purposes. A benefit of decoding a timestamp
allows for manual comparison to disk times to process times for rough estimating and
correlation.

29 While one might assume that this should also hold true for Threads that have similar timestamp offsets,
in practice this appears to not be the case.
30 The FileTime structure format o f 100 nanosecond intervals (aka a “tick”) might seem counter-intuitive,
but this allows a range o f more than 30,000 years to be represented in 64 bits at a finer than one second
resolution. 1000 nanosecond intervals would only yield about 200 years, 1 nanosecond intervals would
likely be too small a time interval for some processor clock speeds. Standard *nix only allows one second
resolution since 1/1/1970. The 1970 date for the ‘birth o f Unix” makes some sense, but I am not sure about
the significance o f 1601. Converting from the Microsoft FileTime 100 nanosecond structure to the *nix 1
second structure does lose some information, but converting the other direction does not add any
information and for the purposes o f this text, one second resolution is sufficient.
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Below are two offsets from a Windows XP SP2 EPROCESS structure (from Appendix B:
EPROCESS dumps of a live typical system - XP SP2). It is easy to see the Low and
High order sections and in fact the 64 bit math required to decode this into a human
readable timestamp is fairly straightforward. Depending on the debugger options, the
offsets will be reported as:
+0x070 CreateTime
+0x078 ExitTime

:_LARGE_INTEGER
:_LARGE_INTEGER

or in a more detail with the same tool as:
+0x07 0 CreateTime
:union LARGE_INTEGER, 4
Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
+0x004 HighPart
Int4B
+0x000 u
struct
unnamed,
+0x000 LowPart
: Uint4B
+ 0x004 HighPart
: Int4B •
+0x0 0 0 QuadPart
: Int8B
+0x078 ExitTime
: union _ L ARGE_INTEGER, 4
Uint4B
+0x0 0 0 LowPart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
+0x000 u
struct
unnamed,
+0x000 LowPart
: Uint4B
+0x004 HighPart
: Int4B
+0x0 00 QuadPart
: Int8B

elements,

0x8 bytes

2 elements,

elements,

0x8 bytes

0x8 bytes

2 elements,

0x8 bytes

The very first portion of the EPROCESS structure is the PCB and at the first offset a
header can be found.
+0x000 Pcb
: struct _ K P R O C E S S , 29 elements, 0x6c bytes
+0x000 Header
: struct _DISPATCHER_HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10 bytes
+0x0 00 Type
UChar
UChar
+0x001 Absolute
UChar
+0x002 Size
+0x003 Inserted
UChar
+0x004 SignalState
Int4B
+0x008 WaitListHead
struct _ L I S T _ E N T R Y , 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x010 ProfileListHead
: struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to

The 16 header bytes specify the type of structure that follows. (The same header is used
not only by processes and threads but also events, semaphores, queues, etc.)
(Russinovich, Solomon, 2005).
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Some processes may seem to share the same or very similar values for locations (such as
the Process Environment Block). These addresses are typically virtual addresses and the
distinction between processes can be shown by converting the virtual address to the
physical address. The procedure is described in the Virtual Addressing and Paging
section and an example can be found in Appendix E: Decoding a Process Owner.

Finding processes in memory image
When searching through a memory dump, the most complete way to search for process
structures will be to start assuming each byte is the first of a process structure until
further offsets show that that was indeed not a first byte of a process, then to shift one
byte and repeat the process. When considering the aforementioned sizes of RAM
available in today’s OSs, this may very well become computationally impractical. On the
other hand it is not safe to assume that all process structures will be allocated on a page
boundary, but it might be safe to assume certain other boundaries (such as an 8 byte
-I

boundary for Windows ). If a particular OS implements certain boundaries, it may be
possible to search based on these offsets in order to greatly reduce the amount of testing
and thus processing.

31 “If the driver requests fewer than P A G E SIZ E bytes, ExAllocatePoolWithTag allocates the number o f
bytes requested. If the driver requests PAGE SIZE or greater bytes, ExAllocatePoolWithTag allocates a
page-aligned buffer that is an integral multiple o f PAGE SIZE bytes. Memory allocations o f less than
PAGE_SIZE do not cross page boundaries and are not necessarily page-aligned; instead, they are aligned
on an 8-byte boundary” (Six Tips for Efficient Memory Usage)
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For each candidate structure a Dispatch Header is assumed, then data members of the
Header can be checked, offsets to other sections o f the EPROCESS or ETHREAD can be
checked, and values of certain fields can be checked because ranges of values for these
fields are known (such as date, process priority range, existence of a PDI, or kernel
memory address which must be mapped above 0x80000000).

Even though each EPROCESS structure contains pointers to other EPROCESS structures
(a doubly linked list), it is preferable to manually locate EPROCESS structures so that the
results can include latent processes and potentially processes attempting concealment
from tools that enumerate processes (such as Task Manager).

EPROCESS structures can be found in different versions of Windows by utilizing
k

different offsets for equivalent portions of the EPROCESS sturucture. For example, a
Windows XP SP2 EPROCESS structure contains the Process ID (PID) at offset 0x0 9c,
while Windows 2000 SP4 EPROCESS structure contains the PID at offset 0x0 84. (See
Appendix F: Offset Deltas by Service Pack for more offset examples)

Windows XP SP2 EPROCESS field (from Appendix B):
+0x09c UniqueProcessId

: Ptr32 to

Windows 2000 SP4 EPROCESS field (from Appendix C):
+0x084 UniqueProcessId

: Ptr32 Void
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Several methods could be used to provide compatibility between the complete and dd
style memory dumps. Since the complete style memory dump contains a header in
addition to the the RAW memory data, the complete memory dump could be ‘converted’
to a dd style dump by removing the header. Similarly, during processing the header
could simply be ignored by skipping to the offset pertaining to the first memory location.
This skip will only introduce minimal overhead (such as having to subtract out the
amount of the skip when reporting sturture location in RAM). Finally, the complete
memory dump can actually be processed identically to that of a dd style dump because
the DMP header size is a multiple of the page size (or more to the point, the first location
of to the contents of the RAM dump falls on the 8 byte scan boundary.)

Conclusions
Acquiring a RAM image from a suspect system is potentially different for every
circumstance. The more information presented to the party performing the acquisition
the better. Some cursory inspection can potentially reveal some items like general
operating system type, and physical connections to the system.

On a pre-Server 2003 SP1 Windows system, the preferred way of acquiring a RAM
image is to use a imaging tool from a trusted source to copy RAM through the
PhysicalMemory object. The image may be stored to a local device connected to the
system (such as Firewire or USB mass storage), or through the network interface.
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A secondary method would be to force a system crash and thus a crash dump of physical
memory to disk. This method will not allow a comparison to the pagefile, but will allow
the contents of physical memory to be acquired and analyzed later. A simple registry
modification paired with a small program that can force a crash could easily be placed on
read only media such as CDROM, floppy disk, or some types o f USB memory sticks. In
this case mass storage would not be required as the memory image would be stored to the
suspect system disk. The actual acquisition of the image would happen when the
physical disk is imaged later in a typical forensic process.

The proof of concept PERL script shows that information about the state of a system can
be found postmortem. At the very least, Task Manger functionality can be simulated
from a RAM image, and in some cases more information is available than Task Manger
is capable of reporting. This does not give a responder the ability to alter the response
based on the state in which the system is found, but does allow the state of the system to
be preserved along with the preservation o f the non-volatile stores.

Direction
The PERL script could be improved in order to make it more likely to be used by
mainstream responders. The current state of the tool is definitely proof of concept and
should not be considered production level. Desirable features may include automatic
detection of the OS from which the RAM was acquired, detection of popular dump
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formats (DMP) versus raw RAM capture, or the extraction of selected processes memory
space. Automated OS detection can be done a variety of ways, trying all possible offsets
looking for number of processes detected, then comparing with known required or default
processes for different OSes.

The proof of concept only emulates Task Manager information. The creation of similar
tools to obtain other popular incident response information (like current network
information, open files, etc) should be explored.

Several interesting directions present themselves in relation to the work done here.
Virtual machines, particularly VMWare™, allow for essentially instant RAM acquisition
because a virtual machine has its “Virtual RAM”

^9

•

stored as a file on the host operating

system. If a virtual machine is suspended, the entire content of RAM for that virtual
machine exist as a logical file that can be copied. Other directions may exist with other
virtual machine related topics like virtual machine monitors, Parallels™, the Trusted
Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) / Trusted Computing Group (TCG) / Palladium,
and hypervisor architecture.

32 The “Virtual RAM” is represented as physical RAM to the Virtual Machine. This is much different that
Virtual Memory discussed elsewhere in this text.
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Appendix A: Methodology notes
Samples were taken from different OS installations on the same hardware utilizing the
Nebraska University Consortium on Information Assurance’s (NUCIA) Security
Technology Education and Analysis Laboratory (STEAL). These samples were taken
from a set of IBM Intellistation MPro model 6220 systems, with 512 MB of RAM.

For each RAM image the machine was left without power for more than 15 minutes then
powered on and the RAM was dumped using one of the techniques outlined in this paper.
Each Windows RAM image was created according to the following process:
1. Use Symantec Ghost to restore a known good installation of the OS.
2. Edit the registry to include the CrashOnCtrlScroll and Complete memory
dump keys
3. Shutdown the system
4. Leave without power for 15 minutes.
5. Power on and log in.
6. Attach external USB mass storage device (hold down left shift to prevent
Autoplay)
7. Insert Helix 1.7 CDROM (allow Autoplay)
8. Use the dd utility found on Helix to perform a RAM dump to the USB device
9. Unmount CDROM and USB device.
10. Force a crash using the Ctrl-ScrLck-ScrLck method
11. Reboot
12. Re-attach USB device and copy the Memory.dmp, ntoskemel and any
minidump.dmp files.

To study RAM persistence, the same machine was used but the machine was restarted
with the power removed for various durations between shutdown and startup.
Additionally, samples were taken from random machines including: IBM Thinkpad R52,
Dell Inspiron 8600, and Gateway 2000 E-4200, for non-baseline tests, and generally for
the availability of a more diverse set of data to inspect.
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Appendix B: EPROCESS dumps of a live typical system - XP SP2
Appendixes B, C and D show kernel debugger output of data structures found in the nt
kernel. The EPROCESS and ETHREAD are two structures that are focused on in this
text for the identification of processes in memory. To aide the reader, portions of these
structures are shown in bold.
kd> dt _eprocess
ntdll!_EPROCESS

+0x000 Pcb

_KPROCESS

+0x06c ProcessLock

_EX_PUSH_LOCK

+0x070 CreateTime
+0x078 ExitTime

LARGEINTEGER
_LARGE_INTEGER

+0x0 80 RundownProtect

_EX_RUNDOWN_REF

+0x084 UniqueProcessId

Ptr32 Void

+0x088
+0x090
+0x09c
+0x0a8
+0x0ac
+0x0b0
+0x0b4
+0x0bc
+0x0c0
+0x0c4
+0x0c8
+0x0cc
+0x0ec
+0x0fO
+0x110
+0x114
+0x118
+ 0x1lc
+0x120
+0x124
+0x128
+0xl2c
+ 0x130
+0x134
+0x138
+0xl3c
+0x14 0
+0x144
+0x148
+0xl4c
+0x150
+0x154
+0x158
+0xl5c
+0x160
+0x168
+0x168
+0x170

ActiveProcessLinks : _LIST_ENTRY
QuotaUsage
[3] Uint4B
QuotaPeak
[3] Uint4B
Uint4B
CommitCharge
Uint4B
PeakVirtualSize
VirtualSize
Uint4B
LIST ENTRY
SessionProcessLinks
Ptr32 Void
DebugPort
Ptr32 Void
ExceptionPort
Ptr32 _HANDLE_TABLE
ObjectTable
Token
_EX_FAST_RE F
WorkingSetLock
_FAST_MUTEX
WorkingSetPage
Uint4B
AddressCreationLock : _FAST_MUTEX
HyperSpaceLock
: Uint4B
ForklnProgress
: Ptr32 _ETHREAD
HardwareTrigger
: Uint4B
VadRoot
:Ptr3 2 Void
VadHint
:Ptr32 Void
CloneRoot
:Ptr3 2 Void
NumberOfPrivatePages : Uint4B
NumberOfLockedPages : Uint4B
Ptr32 Void
Wm32Process
Job
Ptr32 _EJOB
Ptr3 2 Void
SectionObject
SectionBaseAddress : Ptr32 Void
Ptr32 _EPROCESS_QUOTA_BLOCK
QuotaBlock
WorkingSetWatch
: Ptr32 _PAGEFAULT_HISTORY
Win32WindowStation : Ptr32 Void
InheritedFromUniqueProcessId : Ptr32 Void
Ptr3 2 Void
Ldtlnformation
Ptr32 Void
VadFreeHint
Ptr32 Void
VdmObjects
Ptr3 2 Void
DeviceMap
_LIS T_ENTRY
PhysicalVadList
PageDirectoryPte
_HARDWARE_PTE_X8 6
Uint8B
Filler
Ptr32 Void
Session

+0x174 ImageFileName
+0x184 JobLinks
+0xl8c LockedPagesList

+0x190 ThreadListHead
+0x198 SecurityPort
+0xl9c PaeTop

[16] UChar
_LIST_ENTRY
Ptr3 2 Void
_LIST_ENTRY
Ptr32 Void
Ptr32 Void
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+OxlaO
+0xla4
+0xla8
+Oxlac
+OxlbO
+0xlb4
+0xlb8
+OxlcO
+0xlc8
+OxldO
+0xld8
+OxleO
+0xle8
+Oxlec
+Oxlf0
+Oxlf4
+Oxlf8
+0x238
+0x23c
+0x240
+0x244
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x24 8
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x24 8
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x248
+0x24 8
+0x248

ActiveThreads
Uint4B
GrantedAccess
: Uint4B
DefaultHardErrorProcessing : Uint4B
LastThreadExitStatus : Int4B
Peb
: Ptr32 _PEB
PrefetchTrace
: EX FAST REF
_LARGE_INTEGER
ReadOperationCount
_LARGE_INTEGER
WriteOperationCount
_LARGE_INTEGER
OtherOperationCount
ReadTransferCount : _LARGE_INTEGER
WriteTransferCount : _LARGE_INTEGER
OtherTransferCount : _LARGE_INTEGER
Uint4B
CommitChargeLimit
Commi tCharge Peak
Uint4B
Ptr32 Void
AweInfo
SeAuditProcessCreationlnfo : _SE_AUDIT_PROCESS_CREATION_INFO
Vm
: _MMSUPPORT
LastFaultCount
: Uint4B
ModifiedPageCount : Uint4B
Uint4B
NumberOfVads
Uint4B
JobStatus
Uint4B
Flags
Pos 0, 1 Bit
CreateReported
Pos 1, 1 Bit
NoDebuglnherit
ProcessExiting
Pos 2 , 1 Bit
Pos 3 , 1 Bit
ProcessDelete
Wow64SplitPages
Pos 4 , 1 Bit
Pos 5 , 1 Bit
VmDeleted
OutswapEnabled
Pos 6, 1 Bit
Pos 7, 1 Bit
Outswapped
Pos 8 , 1 Bit
ForkFailed
Pos 9, 1 Bit
HasPhysicalVad
AddressSpacelnitialized : Pos 10, 2 Bits
SetTimerResolution : Pos 12, 1 Bit
BreakOnTermination : Pos 13, 1 Bit
SessionCreationUnderway : Pos 14, 1 Bit
WriteWatch
:Pos 15, 1 Bit
ProcessInSession
:Pos 16, 1 Bit
OverrideAddressSpace : Pos 17, 1 Bit
HasAddressSpace
:Pos 18, 1 Bit
LaunchPrefetched
:Pos 19, 1 Bit
InjectlnpageErrors : Pos 20, 1 Bit
VmTopDown
Pos 21, 1 Bit
Unused3
Pos 22, 1 Bit
Unused4
Pos 23, 1 Bit
Pos 2.4, 1 Bit
VdmAllowed
Pos 25, 5 Bits
Unused
Unusedl
POS 30, 1 Bit
Unused2
Pos 31, 1 Bit

+0x24c ExitStatus
+0x250
+0x252
+0x253
+0x252
+0x254
+0x255
+0x258

Xnt4B

NextPageColor
Uint2B
SubSystemMinorVersion
UChar
SubSystemMaj orVersion
UChar
SubSystemVersion : Uint2B
PriorityClass
: UChar
WorkingSetAcquiredUnsafe : UChar
Cookie
: Uint4B

kd> iprocessfields
EPROCESS structure offsets:

(use

'dt nt!_EP R O C E S S ')

kd> dt nt!_eprocess
nt!_EPROCESS

+0x000 Pcb

: _KPROCESS

+0x06c ProcessLock

: _EX_PUSH_LOCK

+0x070 CreateTime
+0x078 ExitTime

: _LARGE_INTEGER
: LARGE INTEGER
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+0x080 RundownProtect

: _EX_RUNDOWN_REF

+0x084 UniqueProcessId

: Ptr32 Void

+0x088
+0x0 90
+0x09c
+0x0a8
+0x0ac
+0x0b0
+0x0b4
+0x0bc
+0x0c0
+0x0c4
+0x0c8
+0x0cc
+0x0ec
+0x0f0
+0x110
+0x114
+0x118
+0xllc
+0x120
+0x124
+0x128
+0xl2c
+0x130
+0x134
+0x138
+0xl3c
+0x140
+0x144
+0x148
+0xl4c
+0x150
+0x154
+0x158
+0xl5c
+0x160
+0x168
+0x168
+0x170

ActiveProcessLinks : _LIS T_ENTRY
QuotaUsage
[3] Uint4B
QuotaPeak
[3] Uint4B
Uint4B
Commi tCharge
PeakVirtualSize
Uint4B
Uint4B
VirtualSize
_LIST_ENTRY
SessionProcessLinks
DebugPort
Ptr32 Void
Ptr32 Void
ExceptionPort
Obj ectTable
Ptr32 _HANDLE__TABLE
Token
_EX_FAST_RE F
WorkingSetLock
_FAST_MUTEX
Uint4B
WorkingSetPage
_FAST_MUTEX
AddressCreationLock
HyperSpaceLock
Uint4B
Ptr32 _ETHREAD
ForklnProgress
Uint4B
HardwareTrigger
VadRoot
Ptr32 Void
VadHint
Ptr32 Void
Ptr32 Void
CloneRoot
NumberOfPrivatePages
Uint4B
NumberOfLockedPages
Uint4B
Ptr32 Void
Win32Process
Job
Ptr32 _EJ0B
Ptr32 Void
SectionObject
SectionBaseAddress : Ptr32 Void
QuotaBlock
: Ptr32 _EPROCESS_QUOTA_BLOCK
WorkingSetWatch
: Ptr32 _PAGEFAULT_HISTORY
Win32WindowStation : Ptr32 Void
InheritedFromUniqueProcessId : Ptr32 Void
Ptr32 Void
LdtInformation
Ptr32 Void
VadFreeHint
Ptr32 Void
VdmObjects
Ptr32 Void
DeviceMap
_LIST_ENTRY
PhysicalVadList
_HARDWARE_PTE
PageDirectoryPte
Uint8B
Filler
Session
Ptr32 Void

+0x174 Image F i 1 eName
+0x184
+0xl8c
+0x190
+0x198
+0xl9c
+0xla0
+0xla4
+0xla8
+0xlac
+0xlb0
+0xlb4
+0xlb8
+0xlc0
+0xlc8
+0xld0
+0xld8
+0xle0
+0xle8
+0xlec
+0xlf0
+0xlf4
+0xlf8
+0x238
+0x23c
+0x240
+0x244

[16] UChar

_LIST_ENTRY
JobLinks
Ptr32 Void
LockedPagesList
_LIST_ENTRY•
ThreadListHead
Ptr32 Void
SecurityPort
Ptr32 V o i d .
PaeTop
Uint4B
ActiveThreads
Uint4B
GrantedAccess
DefaultHardErrorProcessing : Uint4B
LastThreadExitStatus : Int4B
Peb
: Ptr32 _PEB
PrefetchTrace
: EX FAST REF
_LARGE_INTEGER
ReadOperationCount
WriteOperationCount
_LARGE_INTEGER
_LARGE_INTEGER
OtherOperationCount
ReadTransferCount : _LARGE_INTEGER
WriteTransferCount : _LARGE_INTEGER
OtherTransferCount : _LARGE_INTEGER
CommitChargeLimit : Uint4B
Commi t Charge Peak
Uint4B
Awelnfo
Ptr32 Void
SeAuditProcessCreationlnfo
SE AUDIT PROCESS CREATION INFO
Vm
_MM3UPP0RT
Uint4B
LastFaultCount
Uint4B
ModifiedPageCount
Uint4B
NumberOfVads
JobStatus
Uint4B
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Uint4B
+0x248 Flags
+0x248 CreateReported
Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x248 NoDebuglnherit
Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessExiting
Pos 2 , 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessDelete
Pos 3 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Wow64SplitPages
Pos 4, 1 Bit
+0x248 VmDeleted
Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x248 OutswapEnabled
Pos 6, 1 Bit
+0x248 Outswapped
Pos 7, 1 Bit
+0x248 ForkFailed
Pos 8, 1 Bit
+0x248 HasPhysicalVad
Pos 9, 1 Bit
+0x248 AddressSpacelnitialized : Pos 10, 2 Bit
I0x218 SetTimerReoolution : T o d 12, 1 Bit
+0x248 BreakOnTermination : Pos 13, 1 Bit
+0x248 SessionCreationUnderway : Pos 14, 1 Bit
+0x248 WriteWatch
Pos 15 , 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessInSession
Pos 16 , 1 Bit
+0x248 OverrideAddressSpace : Pos 17, 1 Bit
+0x248 HasAddressSpace
Pos 18 , 1 Bit
+0x248 LaunchPrefetched
Pos 19 , 1 Bit
+0x248 InjectlnpageErrors : Pos 20, 1 Bit
+0x248 VmTopDown
Pos 21 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused3
Pos 22 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused4
Pos 2 3 , 1 Bit
+0x248 VdmAllowed
Pos 24 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused
POS 2 5 , 5 Bits
+0x248 Unusedl
Pos 3 0 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused2
Pos 31 , 1 Bit
+0x24c ExitStatus
Int4B
+0x250 NextPageColor
Uint2B
+0x252 SubSystemMinorVersion : UChar
+0x253 SubSystemMajorVersion : UChar
Uint2B
+0x252 SubSystemVersion
+0x254 PriorityClass
UChar
+0x2 55 WorkingSetAcquiredUnsafe : UChar
+0x258 Cookie
Uint4B
kd> (process
PROCESS 89202af8
Sessionld: 0 Cid: 0e9c
Peb: 7ffdc000
ParentCid: 05e0
DirBase: 0ca8a000
ObjectTable: el5c3eb0
HandleCount: 126.
I m a g e : k d .exe
VadRoot 89bb4e40 Vads 51 Clone 0 Private 1744. Modified 5. Locked 0.
DeviceMap el4f75b8
Token
e5d4d7f0
ElapsedTime
00:00:02 663
UserTime
00:00:00 310
Ke rneITime
00:00:00 060
QuotaPoolUsage[PagedPool]
15680
QuotaPoolUsage[NonPagedPool]
2040
Working Set Sizes (now,min,max)
(2348, 50, 345) (9392KB, 200KB, 1380KB)
PeakWorkingSetSize
2348
VirtualSize
21 Mb
PeakVirtualSize
21 Mb
PageFaultCount
3551
MemoryPriority
BACKGROUND
BasePriority
8
CommitCharge
20 76
THREAD 88493668
Cid 0e9c.0ad4
T e b : 7ffdf000 Win32Thread:
ING on processor 0
THREAD 88ffdda8
Cid 0e9c.0a5c
Teb: 7ffde000 Win32Thread:
: (WrLpcReply) UserMode Non-Alertable
88ffdf9c
Semaphore Limit 0x1

kd>

00000000 RUNN
00000000 WAIT
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kd> dt -a -b -v _EPROCESS
struct _EPROCESS, 107 elements, 0x260 bytes
struct _KPROCESS, 2 9 elements, 0x6c bytes
+0x000 Pcb
+0x0 00 Header
: struct _DISPATCHER_HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10 bytes
UChar
+0x00 0 Type
+0x001 Absolute
UChar
+0x002 Size
UChar
UChar
+0x003 Inserted
+0x004 SignalState
Int4B
struct _ L I S T _ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x008 WaitListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
+0x010 ProfileListHead
: struct _ L I S T_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
Uint4B
+0x018 DirectoryTableBase : (2 elements)
+0x020 LdtDescriptor
: struct _ K G D T E N T R Y , 3 elements, 0x8 bytes
Uint2B
+0x000 LimitLow
Uint2B
+0x002 BaseLow
union
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x004 HighWord
: struct
unnamed, 4 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x000 Bytes
UChar
+0x000 BaseMid
UChar
+0x001 Flagsl
UChar
+0x002 Flags2
UChar
+0x003 BaseHi
struct
unnamed, 10 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x000 Bits
Bitfield Pos 0, 8 Bits
+0x000 BaseMid
Bitfield Pos 8, 5 Bits
+0x000 Type
Bitfield Pos 13,, 2 Bits
+0x000 Dpi
Bitfield Pos 15,, 1 Bit
+0x000 Pres
Bitfield Pos 16, 4 Bits
+0x000 LimitHi
Bitfield Pos 20, 1 Bit
+0x000 Sys
Bitfield Pos 21, 1 Bit
+0x000 Reserved_0
Bitfield Pos 22, 1 Bit
+0x000 Default_Big
Bitfield Pos 23, 1 Bit
+0x000 Granularity
Bitfield Pos 24, 8 Bits
+0x000 BaseHi
struct _K I D T E N T R Y , 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x028 Int21Descriptor
Uint2B
+0x000 Offset
Uint2B
+0x002 Selector
Uint2B
+0x004 Access
Uint2B
+0x006 ExtendedOffset
Uint2B
+0x030 IopmOffset
UChar
+0x032 Iopl
UChar
+0x033 Unused

+0x034 ActiveProcessors

Uint4B

+0x038 KernelTime
+0x03c UserTime
+0x040 ReadyListHead
+0x000 Flink
+0x004 Blink
+0x048 SwapListEntry

Uint4B
Uint4B
struct _LIST _ E N T R Y , 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
: Ptr32 to
struct
SINGLE LIST ENTRY, 1 elements, 0x4 bytes

+0x000 Next
+0x04c VdmTrapcHandler

: Ptr32 to
: Ptr32 to

+0x050 ThreadListHead
+0x000 Flink
+0x004 Blink

: Struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements,
: Ptr32 to
: Ptr32 to

+0x058 ProcessLock
+0x05c Affinity
+0x060 StackCount

: Uint4B
: Uillt4B
: Uint2B

+0x062 BasePriority

: Char

+0x063
+0x064
+0x065
+0x066

:
:
:
:

ThreadQuantum
AutoAlignment
State
ThreadSeed

Char
UChar
UChar
UChar

0x8 bytes
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+0x067 DisableBoost
UChar
UChar
+0x068 PowerState
UChar
+0x069 DisableQuantum
UChar
+0x06a IdealNode
+0x06b Flags
Struct _KEXECUTE_OPTIONS, 7 elements, 0x1 bytes
: Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x000 ExecuteDisable
+0x000 ExecuteEnable
: Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x000 DisableThunkEmulation : Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0x000 Permanent
: Bitfield Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x000 ExecuteDispatchEnable : Bitfield Pos 4, 1 Bit
+0x000 ImageDispatchEnable : Bitfield Pos 5 1 Bit
Bits
: Bitfield Pos 6,
+0x000 Spare
: UChar
+0x06b ExecuteOptions
EX PUSH LOCK, 5 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x06c ProcessLock
: struct
+0x000 Waiting
Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x000 Exclusive
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 2, 30 Bits
+0x0 00 Shared
Uint4B
+0x000 Value
Ptr32 to
+0x000 Ptr

+0x070 CreateTime
+0x000 LowPart
+0x004 HighPart
+0x000 u
+0x000 LowPart
+0x004 HighPart
+0x000 QuadPart

: union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Uint4B
: Int4B
: struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Uint4B
: Int4B
: Int8B

+0x078 ExitTime
+0x000 LowPart
+0x004 HighPart
+0x000 u
+0x000 LowPart
+0x004 HighPart

: union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Uint4B
: Int4B
: struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Uint4B
: Int4B

+0x0 00 QuadPart
+0x08 0 RundownProtect
+0x0 00 Count
+0x000 Ptr

: Int8B
: struct _EX_RUNDOWN_REF,
: Uint4B
: Ptr32 to

+0x084 UniqueProcessId

: Ptr32 to

2 elements,

0x4 bytes

+0x088 ActiveProcessLinks : struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
(3 elements)
Uint4B
+0x090 QuotaUsage
(3 elements)
Uint4B
+0x09c QuotaPeak
Uint4B '
+0x0a8 CommitCharge
Uint4B
+0x0ac PeakVirtualSize
+0x0b0 VirtualSize
Uint4B
struct _ L I S T_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x0b4 SessionProcessLinks
Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
+0x004 Blink
Ptr32 to
Ptr32 to
+0x0bc DebugPort
+0x0c0 ExceptionPort
Ptr32 to
+0x0c4 ObjectTable
Ptr32 to
Struct _EX_FAST_REF, 3 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x0c8 Token
Ptr32 to
+0x000 Object
+0x000 RefCnt
Bitfield Pos 0, 3 Bits
Uint4B
+0x000 Value
struct _FAST_MUTEX, 5 elements, 0x2 0 bytes
+0x0cc WorkingSetLock
Int4B
+0x000 Count
+0x004 Owner
Ptr32 to
Uint4B
+0x008 Contention
struct _ K E V E N T , 1 elements, 0x10 bytes
+0x00c Event
: Struct
DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10 b
+0x000 Header
ytes
+0x00 0 Type
UChar
UChar
+0x001 Absolute
UChar
+0x002 Size
UChar
+0x003 Inserted
+0x004 SignalState
Int4B
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struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x008 WaitListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x01c Oldlrql
: Uint4B
+0x0ec WorkingSetPage
: Uint4B
+0x0f0 AddressCreationLock
struct _FAST_MUTEX, 5 elements, 0x2 0 bytes
Int4B
+0x00 0 Count
Ptr32 to
+0x004 Owner
Uint4B
+0x008 Contention
struct _ K E V E N T , 1 elements, 0x10 bytes
+0x00c Event
: struct
DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10 b
+0x000 Header
ytes
UChar
i0x00 0 Type
UChar
+0x001 Absolute
UChar
+0x002 Size
UChar
+0x003 Inserted
Int4B
+0x004 SignalState
struct _ L I S T_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x008 WaitListHead
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x01c Oldlrql
: Uint4B
+0x110 HyperSpaceLock
:Uint4B
+0x114 ForklnProgress
: Ptr32 to
+0x118 HardwareTrigger
:Uint4B
+0xllc VadRoot
: Ptr32 to
+0x120 VadHint
: Ptr32 to
+0x124 CloneRoot
: Ptr32 to
+0x128 NumberOfPrivatePages : Uint4B
+0xl2c NumberOfLockedPages : Uint4B
+0x130 Win32Process
: Ptr32 to
+0x134 Job
: Ptr32 to
+0x138 SectionObject
: Ptr32 to
+0xl3c SectionBaseAddress : Ptr32 to
+0x14 0 QuotaBlock
: Ptr32 to
+0x144 WorkingSetWatch
: Ptr32 to
+0x148 Win32WindowStation : Ptr32 to
+0xl4c InheritedFromUniqueProcessId : Ptr32 to
+0x150 Ldtlnformation
Ptr32 to
Ptr32 to
+0x154 VadFreeHint
Ptr32 to
+0x158 VdmObjects
Ptr32 to
+0xl5c DeviceMap
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x160 PhysicalVadList
Ptr32 to
+0x000 FI ink
Ptr32 to
+0x004 B1 ink
168 PageDirectoryPte : struct
HARDWARE_PTE _ X86, 13
Bitfield Pos 0 , 1 Bit
+0x000 Valid
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x000 Write
Bitfield Pos 2 , 1 Bit
+0x000 Owner
Bitfield Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x000 Wr it eThrough
Bitfield Pos 4 , 1 Bit
+0x000 CacheDisable
Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x000 Accessed
Bitfield Pos 6, 1 Bit
+0x000 Dirty
Bitfield Pos 7, 1 Bit
+0x000 LargePage
Bitfield Pos 8 , 1 Bit
+0x000 Global
Bitfield Pos 9, 1 Bit
+0x000 CopyOnWrite
Bitfield Pos 10, 1 Bit
+0x000 Prototype
Bitfield Pos 11, 1 Bit
+0x000 reserved
Bitfield Pos 12 , 20 Bits
+0x000 PageFrameNumber
Uint8B
+0x168 Filler
Ptr32 to
+0x170 Session

+0x174 ImageFileName

(16 elements)

+0x184 JobLinks
t0x00 0 Flink
+0x004 Blink
+0xl8c LockedPagesList
+0x190 ThreadListHead
+0x000 Flink

struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements,
: Ptr32 to
: Ptr32 to
Ptr32 to
struct _ LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements,
: Ptr32 to

UChar
0x8 bytes

0x8 bytes

+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x198 SecurityPort
:Ptr32 to
+0xl9c PaeTop
:Ptr32 to
+0xla0 ActiveThreads
:Uint4B
+0xla4 GrantedAccess
:Uint4B
+0xla8 DefaultHardErrorProcessing : Uint4B
+0xlac LastThreadExitStatus : Int4B
+0xlb0 Peb
:Ptr3 2 to
+0xlb4 PrefetchTrace
:struct _EX_FAST_REF, 3 elements, 0x4 bytes
Ptr32 to
+0x000 Object
Bitfield Pos 0, 3 Bits
+0x000 RefCnt
Uint4B
+0x000 Value
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytea
+0xlb8 ReadOperationCeunt
Uint4B
+0x0 00 LowPart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
Int8B
+0x0 00 QuadPart
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0xlc0 WriteOperationCount
Uint4B
+0x0 00 LowPart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
Int8B
+0x0 00 QuadPart
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0xlc8 OtherOperationCount
Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
Int4B
+0x0 04 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x0 00 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
: Int8B
+0x0 00 QuadPart
+0xld0 ReadTransferCount : union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
Uint4B
+0x0 00 LowPart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x0 00 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
Int8B
+0x0 00 QuadPart
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0xld8 WriteTransferCount
Uint4B
+0x0 00 LowPart
Int4B '
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x0 00 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x0 04 HighPart
Int8B
+0x0 00 QuadPart
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0xle0 OtherTransferCount
Uint4B
+0x0 00 LowPart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x0 00 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
Int8B
+0x0 00 QuadPart
+0xle8 CommitChargeLimit : Uint4B
Uint4B
+0xlec CommitChargePeak
Ptr32 to
+0xlf0 Awelnfo
struct
SE AUDIT PROCESS CREATION INFO,
+0xlf4 SeAuditProcessCreationlnfo
elements, 0x4 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 ImageFileName
struct _MMSUPPORT, 14 elements, 0x40 bytes
+0xlf8 Vm
: union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 LastTrimTime
Uint4D
+0x0 00 LowPart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x00 0 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
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+0x000 QuadPart
: Int8B
+0x008 Flags
struct _MMSUPPORT_FLAGS, 9 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x000 SessionSpace
: Bitfield Pos 0 , 1 Bit
+0x000 BeingTrimmed
: Bitfield Pos 1 , 1 Bit
+0x000 SessionLeader
: Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 3 , 1 Bit
+0x000 TrimHard
+0x000 WorkingSetHard
: Bitfield Pos 4 , 1 Bit
+0x000 AddressSpaceBeingDeleted : Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x000 Available
: Bitfield Pos 6, 10 Bits
+0x000 AllowWorkingSetAdjustment : Bitfield Pos 16, 8 Bits
+0x000 MemoryPriority
: Bitfield Pos 24 , 8 Bits
+0x00c PageFaultCount
: Uint4B
+0x010 PeakWorkingSetSize : Uint4B
+0x014 WorkingSetSize
: Uint4B
+0x018 MinimumWorkingSetSize : Uint4B
+0x01c MaximumWorkingSetSize : Uint4B
+0x020 VmWorkingSetList : Ptr32 to
+0x024 WorkingSetExpansionLinks : struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 byte
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x02c Claim
: Uint4B
+0x030 NextEstimationSlot : Uint4B
+0x034 NextAgingSlot
: Uint4B
+0x038 EstimatedAvailable : Uint4B
+0x03c GrowthSinceLastEstimate
Uint4B
+0x238 LastFaultCount
Uint4B
+0x23c Modif iedPageCount : Uint4B
Uint4B
+0x240 NumberOfVads
+0x244 JobStatus
Uint4B
Uint4B
+0x248 Flags
+0x248 CreateReported
Bitfield Pos 0 , 1 Bit
+0x248 NoDebuglnherit
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessExiting
Bitfield Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessDelete
Bitfield Pos 4 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Wow64SplitPages
+0x248 VmDeleted
Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x248 OutswapEnabled
Bitfield Pos 6 , 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 7, 1 Bit
+0x248 Outswapped
Bitfield Pos 8 , 1 Bit
+0x248 ForkFailed
Bitfield Pos 9, 1 Bit
+0x248 HasPhysicalVad
+0x248 AddressSpacelnitialized : Bitfield Pos 10, 2 Bit
+0x248 SetTimerResolution : Bitfield Pos 12, 1 Bit
+0x248 BreakOnTermination : Bitfield Pos 13, 1 Bit
+0x248 SessionCreationUnderway : Bitfield Pos 14, 1 Bit
+0x248 WriteWatch
Bitfield Pos 15, 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessInSession
Bitfield Pos 16, 1 Bit
+0x24 8 OverrideAddressSpace : Bitfield Pos 17, 1 Bit
+0x248 HasAddressSpace
Bitfield Pos 18 , 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 19 , 1 Bit
+0x248 LaunchPrefetched
+0x248 InjectlnpageErrors : Bitfield Pos 20, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 21 , 1 Bit
+0x248 VmTopDown
+0x248 Unused3
Bitfield Pos 22 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused4
Bitfield Pos 23 , 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 24 , 1 Bit
+0x248 VdmAllowed
Bitfield Pos 25 , 5 Bits
+0x248 Unused
+0x248 Unusedl
Bitfield Pos 30 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused2
Bitfield Pos 31 , 1 Bit
Int4B
+0x24c ExitStatus
Uint2B
+0x250 NextPageColor
+0x252 SubSystemMinorVersion : UChar
+0x253 SubSystemMajorVersion : UChar
+ 0x2 52 SubSyst emVer s ion
Uint2B
+0x2 54 PriorityClass
UChar
+0x255 WorkingSetAcquiredUnsafe : UChar
+0x258 Cookie
Uint4B
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Appendix C: EPROCESS structure of Microsoft Windows 2000, Service
Pack 4.
kd> dt -a -b -v _EPROCESS
struct _EPROCESS, 94 elements, 0x290 bytes
+0x000 Pcb
struct _KPROCESS, 2 6 elements, 0x6e bytes
+0x000 Header
: struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10
bytes
UChar
+0x000 Type
UChar
i0x001 Absolute
UChar
+0x002 Size
UChar
+0x003 Inserted
Int4B
+0x004 SignalState
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x008 WaitListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
+0x010 ProfileListHead
: struct _ L I S T _ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
Uint4B
+0x018 DirectoryTableBase : (2 elements)
+0x02 0 LdtDescriptor
: struct _KGDTENTRY, 3 elements, 0x8 bytes
Uint2B
+0x000 LimitLow
Uint2B
+0x002 BaseLow
union
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x0 04 HighWord
: struct
unnamed, 4 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x000 Bytes
+0x000 BaseMid
UChar
+0x001 Flagsl
UChar
+0x002 Flags2
UChar
+0x003 BaseHi
UChar
0x000 Bits
: struct
unnamed, 10 element
+0x000 BaseMid
Bitfield Pos 0, 8 Bits
Bitfield Pos 8, 5 Bits
+0x000 Type
+0x000 Dpi
Bitfield Pos 13 , 2 Bits
+0x000 Pres
Bitfield Pos 15, 1 Bit
+0x000 LimitHi
Bitfield Pos 16, 4 Bits
+0x000 Sys
Bitfield Pos 20, 1 Bit
+0x000 Reserved_0
Bitfield Pos 21, 1 Bit
+0x000 Default Big
Bitfield Pos 22 , 1 Bit
+0x000 Granularity
Bitfield Pos 23, 1 Bit
+0x000 BaseHi
Bitfield Pos 24, 8 Bits
Int21Descriptor
: struct _KIDTENTRY, 4 elements, 0x8
+0x000 Offset
Uint2B
Uint2B
+0x002 Selector
Uint2B
+0x004 Access
+0x006 ExtendedOffset
Uint2B
+0x030 IopmOffset
Uint2B
+0x032 Iopl
UChar
UChar
+0x03 3 VdmFlag
+0x034 ActiveProcessors
Uint4B
+0x038 KernelTime
Uint4B
+0x03c UserTime
Uint4B
struct
LIST_
2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x040 ReadyListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x04 8 SwapListEntry
struct _ LIST_
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x0 04 Blink
LIST
+0x050 ThreadListHead
struct
2 elements, 0x8 bytes
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: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
Uint4B
+0x058 ProcessLock
Uint4B
+0x05c Affinity
Uint2B
+0x060 StackCount
Char
+0x062 BasePriority
Char
+0x063 ThreadQuantum
UChar
+0x064 AutoAlignment
UChar
+0x065 State
UChar
+0x066 ThreadSeed
UChar
+0x067 DisableBoost
UChar
+0x068 PowerState
UChar
+0x069 DisableQuantum
(2 elements)
UChar
+0x06a Spare
+0x06c ExitStatus
: Int4B
+0x070 LockEvent
: struct _ K E V E N T , 1 elements, 0x10 bytes
: struct _DISPATCHER_HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10
+0x000 Header
bytes
UChar
+0x00 0 Type
UChar
+0x001 Absolute
UChar
+0x002 Size
UChar
+0x003 Inserted
Int4B
+0x004 SignalState
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x008 WaitListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x08 0 LockCount
: Uint4B
+0x088 CreateTime
: union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
: struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
: Int8B
+ 0x0,0 0 QuadPart
+0x090 ExitTime
: union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x00 0 LowPart
: Uint4B
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
+0x000 u
: struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
: Int8B
+0x000 QuadPart
+0x098 LockOwner
: Ptr32 to
+0x09c UniqueProcessId
: Ptr32 to
+0x0a0 ActiveProcessLinks : struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
Uint4B
+0x0a8 QuotaPeakPoolUsage : (2 elements)
(2 elements)
Uint4B
+0x0b0 QuotaPoolUsage
Uint4B
+0x0b8 PagefileUsage
+0x0bc CommitCharge
Uint4B
+0x0c0 PeakPagefileUsage : Uint4B
Uint4B
+0x0c4 PeakVirtualSize
+0x0c8 VirtualSize
Uint4B
struct _ M M S U P P O R T , 19 elements, 0x4 8 bytes
+0x0d0 Vm
: union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 LastTrimTime
Uint4B
i0x00 0 Lowrart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
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+0x000 QuadPart
: Int8B
+0x008 LastTrimFaultCount : Uint4B
+0x00c PageFaultCount
: Uint4B
+0x010 PeakWorkingSetSize : Uint4B
+0x014 WorkingSetSize
: Uint4B
+0x018 MinimumWorkingSetSize : Uint4B
+0x01c MaximumWorkingSetSize : Uint4B
+0x02 0 VmWorkingSetList : Ptr32 to
+0x024 WorkingSetExpansionLinks : struct

LIST ENTRY,

2 elements,

0x8

+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x02c AllowWorkingSetAdjustment : UChar
+0x02d AddressSpaceBeingDeleted : UChar
+0x02e ForegroundSwitchCount : UChar
+0x02f MemoryPriority
: UChar
+0x03 0 u
: union
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x4 bytes
Uint4B
+0x000 LongFlags
struct
+0x000 Flags
MMSUPPORT FLAGS, 8 elements,

0x4

bytes

bytes
+0x000 SessionSpace
Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x000 BeingTrimmed
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 2 , 1 Bit
+0x000 ProcessInSession
+0x000 SessionLeader
Bitfield Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x000 TrimHard
Bitfield Pos 4, 1 Bit
+0x000 WorkingSetHard
Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x000 WriteWatch
Bitfield Pos 6, 1 Bit
+0x000 Filler
Bitfield Pos 7, 25 Bits
+0x034 Claim
: Uint4B
+0x038 NextEstimationSlot : Uint4B
+0x03c NextAgingSlot
: Uint4B
+0x040 EstimatedAvailable : Uint4B
+0x044 GrowthSinceLastEstimate : Uint4B
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x118 SessionProcessLinks
Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
Ptr32 to
+0x12 0 DebugPort
Ptr32 to
+0x124 ExceptionPort
Ptr32 to
+0x12 8 ObjectTable
Ptr32 to
+0xl2c Token
struct _FAST_MUTEX, 5 elements, 0x20 bytes
+0x13 0 WorkingSetLock
Int4B
+0x0 0 0 Count
+0x004 Owner
Ptr32 to
+0x008 Contention
Uint4B
+0x0 0c Event
struct _KEVENT, 1 elements, 0x10 bytes
: struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10
+0x000 Header
bytes
+0x0 00 Type
UChar
UChar
+0x001 Absolute
+0x002 Size
UChar
UChar
+0x003 Inserted
Int4B
+0x004 SignalState
+0x008 WaitListHead
struct _ L I S T _ E N T R Y , 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x01c Oldlrql
: Uint4D
+0x150 WorkingSetPage
: Uint4B
+0x154 ProcessOutswapEnabled : UChar
+0x155 ProcessOutswapped : UChar
+0x156 AddressSpacelnitialized : UChar
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UChar
+0x157 AddressSpaceDeleted
+0x158 AddressCreationLock
struct _FAST_MUTEX, 5 elements, 0x2 0 bytes
Int4B
+0x0 0 0 Count
+0x004 Owner
Ptr3 2 to
+0x008 Contention
Uint4B
+0x00c Event
struct _ K E V E N T , 1 elements, 0x10 bytes
: struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10
+0x000 Header
bytes
UChar
+0x0 0 0 Type
UChar
+0x001 Absolute
UChar
+0x002 Size
UChar
+0x003 Inserted
Int4B
+0x004 SignalState
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8'bytes
+0x008 WaitListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
+0x01c Oldlrql
: Uint4B
+0x178 HyperSpaceLock
:Uint4B
+0xl7c ForklnProgress
:Ptr32 to
+0x180 VmOperation
:Uint2B
+0x182 ForkWasSuccessful : UChar
+0x183 MmAgressiveWsTrimMask : UChar
+0x184 VmOperationEvent : Ptr32 to
+0x188 PaeTop
. : Ptr32 to
+0xl8c LastFaultCount
: Uint4B
+0x190 ModifiedPageCount : Uint4B
+0x194 VadRoot
:Ptr32 to
+0x198 VadHint
:Ptr32 to
+0xl9c CloneRoot
:Ptr32 to
+0xla0 NumberOfPrivatePages : Uint4B
+0xla4 NumberOfLockedPages : Uint4B
+0xla8 NextPageColor
:Uint2B
+0xlaa ExitProcessCalled : UChar
+0xlab CreateProcessReported : UChar
+0xlac SectionHandle
:Ptr32 to
+0xlb0 Peb
:Ptr32 to
+0xlb4 SectionBaseAddress : Ptr32 to
+0xlb8 QuotaBlock
:Ptr32 to
+0xlbc LastThreadExitStatus : Int4B
+0xlc0 WorkingSetWatch
: Ptr32 to
+0xlc4 Win32WindowStation : Ptr32 to
+0xlc8 InheritedFromUniqueProcessId : Ptr32 to
+0xlcc GrantedAccess
:Uint4B
Uint4B
+0xld0 DefaultHardErrorProcessing
+0xld4 Ldtlnformation
Ptr32 to
Ptr32 to
+0xld8 VadFreeHint
Ptr32 to
+0xldc VdmObjects
Ptr32 to
+0xle0 DeviceMap
Uint4B
+0xle4 Sessionld
struct _ LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0xle8 PhysicalVadList
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
struct _HARDWARE_PTE_X86 13 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0xlf0 PageDirectoryPte
+0x000 Valid
Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x000 Write
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x00 0 Owner
Bitfield Poe 2, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x000 WriteThrough
Bitfield Pos 4, 1 Bit
+0x000 CacheDisable
Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x000 Accessed
+0x0 0 0 Dirty
Bitfield Pos 6, 1 Bit
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Bitfield Pos 7, 1 Bit
+0x0 0 0 LargePage
Bitfield Pos 8, 1 Bit
+0x000 Global
Bitfield POs 9, 1 Bit
+0x0 0 0 CopyOnWrite
Bitfield Pos 10, 1 Bit
+0x000 Prototype
Bitfield Pos 11, 1 Bit
+0x000 reserved
+0x0 0 0 PageFrameNumber
Bitfield Pos 12, 20 Bits
+0xlf0 Filler
: Uint8B
+0xlf8 PaePageDirectoryPage : Uint4B
UChar
+0xlfc ImageFileName
: (16 elements)
+0x2 0c VmTrimFaultValue : Uint4B
+0x210 SetTimerResolution : UChar
+0x211 PriorityClass
: UChar
+0x212 SubSystemMinorVersion : UChar
+0x213 SubSystemMajorVersion : UChar
+0x212 SubSystemversion : Uint2B
+0x214 Win32Process
Ptr32 to
Ptr32 to
+0x218 Job
Uint4B
+0x21c JobStatus
struct _ L IST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x220 JobLinks
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
Ptr32 to
+0x228 LockedPagesList
Ptr32 to
+0x22c SecurityPort
Ptr32 to
+0x230 Wow64Process
+0x2 3 8 ReadOperationCount : union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
Uint4B
+0x0 00 LowPart
Int4B
+0x0 04 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x0 0 0 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x0 04 HighPart
Int 8B
+0x0 0 0 QuadPart
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x240 WriteOperationCount
Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x0 0 0 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x0 04 HighPart
Int 8B
+0x0 0 0 QuadPart
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x24 8 OtherOperationCount
Uint4B
+0x0 0 0 LowPart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x0 0 0 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
: Int8B
+0x0 0 0 QuadPart
+0x2 50 ReadTransferCount : union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
Uint4B
+0x0 0 0 LowPart
Int 4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x0 0 0 u
: Uint4B
+0x0 0 0 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x0 04 HighPart
Int 8B
+0x00 0 QuadPart
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x2 58 WriteTransferCount
Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
Int 8B
+0x0 00 QuadPart
union LARGE INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x260 OtherTransferCount
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Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x00 0 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
: Int8B
+0x000 QuadPart
Uint4B
+0x26 8 CommitChargeLimit
Uint4B
+0x26c CommitChargePeak
struct
L I S T E N T R Y , 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x27 0 ThreadListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
+0x278 VadPhysicalPagesBitMap : Ptr32 to
+0x27c VadPhysicalPages :Uint4B
+0x280 AweLock
:Uint4B
+0x284 plmageFileName
:Ptr32 to
+0x288 Session
:Ptr32 to
+0x28c Flags
:Uint4B

71

Appendix D: ETHREAD structure dump from WinXP SP2
kd> dt -a -b -v _ETHREAD
struct _ETHREAD, 54 elements,
+0x00 0 Teh

+0x000 Header

0x2 5 8 bytes
struct _KTHREAD, 78 elements,
: struct DISPATCHER HEADER,

OxlcQ bytes
6 elements, 0x10

byte
s
UChar
+0x000 Type
UChar
+0x001 Absolute
UChar
+0x002 Size
+0x003 Inserted
UChar
Int4B
,+0x004 SignalState
struct _ L I S T _ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x008 WaitListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
struct _ L I S T _ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x010 MutantListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
+0x018 InitialStack
Ptr32 to
Ptr32 to
+0x01c StackLimit
Ptr32 to
+0x020 Teb
Ptr32 to
+0x024 TlsArray
Ptr32 to
+0x028 KernelStack
+0x02c DebugActive
UChar
UChar
+0x02d State
(2 elements)
UChar
+0x02e Alerted
UChar
+0x030 Iopl
UChar
+0x031 NpxState
+0x032 Saturation
Char
+0x033 Priority
Char
struct _KAPC_STATE, 5 elements, 0x18 bytes
+0x034 ApcState
: (2 elements)
struct
LIST ENTRY, 2
+0x000 ApcListHead
elements,
0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
Ptr32 to
+0x010 Process
+0x014 KernelApcInProgress : UChar
+0x015 KernelApcPending : UChar
+0x016 UserApcPending
: UChar
Uint4B
+0x04c ContextSwitches
+0x050 IdleSwapBlock
UChar
(3 elements)
UChar
+0x051 SpareO
+0x054 WaitStatus
Int4B
UChar
+0x058 Waitlrql
+0x059 WaitMode
Char
+0x05a WaitNext
UChar
+0x05b WaitReason
UChar
+0x05c WaitBlockList
Ptr32 to
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x060 WaitListEntry
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
struct
SINGLE LIST ENTRY, 1 elements, 0x4
+0x0GO SwapListEntry
bytes
+0x000 Next

Ptr32 to
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+0x068
+0x06c
+0x0 6d
+0x06e
+0x06f
+0x070

WaitTime
BasePriority
DecrementCount
PriorityDecrement
Quantum
WaitBlock

Uint4B
Char
UChar
: Char
Char
(4 elements)

struct

KWAIT BLOCK,

6 elements,

xl8 bytes
+0x000 WaitListEntry
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
Ptr32 to
+0x008 Thread
Ptr32 to
+0x00c Object
Ptr32 to
+0x010 NextWaitBlock
Uint2B
+0x014 WaitKey
Uint2B
+0x016 WaitType
+0x0d0 LegoData
Ptr32 to
Uint4B
+0x0d4 KernelApcDisable
Uint4B
+0x0d8 UserAffinity
UChar
+0x0dc SystemAffinityActive
UChar
+0x0dd PowerState
UChar
+0x0de Npxlrql
UChar
+0x0df InitialNode
Ptr32 to
+0x0e0 ServiceTable
Ptr32 to
+0x0e4 Queue
Uint4B
+0x0e8 ApcQueueLock
struct _KTIMER, 5 elements, 0x28 bytes
+ 0x0f0 Timer
: struct
DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10
+0x000 Header
b
ytes
UChar
+0x0 0 0 Type
UChar
+0x001 Absolute
UChar
+0x002 Size
UChar
+0x003 Inserted
+0x004 SignalState
Int4B
struct _ L I S T _ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x008 WaitListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
union _ULARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x010 DueTime
Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
Uint4B
+0x0 04 HighPart
struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x00 0 LowPart
: Uint4B
+0x0 04 HighPart
: Uint8B
+0x000 QuadPart
: struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x018 TimerListEntry
: Ptr32 to
+0x0 0 0 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x0 04 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x02 0 Dpc
+0x024 Period
: Int4B
+0x118 QueueListEntry
: struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x120 SoftAffinity
Uint4B
Uint4B
+0x124 Affinity
i0x128 Preempted
UChar
+0x129 ProcessReadyQueue : UChar
UChar
+0xl2a KernelStackResident
+0xl2b NextProcessor
: UChar
+0xl2c CallbackStack
: Ptr32 to
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Ptr32 to
+0x13 0 Win32Thread
+0x13 4 TrapFrame
Ptr32 to
+0x13 8 ApcStatePointer
(2 elements)
Ptr32 to
Char
+0x140 PreviousMode
+0x141 EnableStackSwap
UChar
+0x142 LargeStack
UChar
UChar
+0x143 Resourcelndex
+0x144 KernelTime
Uint4B
+0x148 UserTime
Uint4B
+0xl4c SavedApcState
struct _KAPC_STATE, 5 elements, 0x18 bytes
(2 elements)
struct
LIST ENTRY, 2
+0x000 ApcListHead
elements,
0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
Ptr32 to
+0x010 Process
+0x014 KernelApcInProgress : UChar
+0x015 KernelApcPending : UChar
+0x016 UserApcPending
: UChar
+0x164 Alertable
: UChar
+0x165 ApcStatelndex
UChar
UChar
+0x166 ApcQueueable
UChar
+0x16 7 AutoAlignment
Ptr32 to
+0x168 StackBase
+0xl6c SuspendApc
struct _KAPC, 14 elements, 0x3 0 bytes
Int2B
+0x000 Type
+0x002 Size
Int2B
Uint4B
+0x004 SpareO
Ptr32 to
+0x008 Thread
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x00c ApcListEntry
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
Ptr32 to
+0x014 KernelRoutine
Ptr32 to
+0x018 RundownRoutine
Ptr32 to
+0x01c NormalRoutine
+0x02 0 NormalContext
Ptr32 to
Ptr32 to
+0x024 SystemArgumentl
+0x02 8 SystemArgument2
Ptr3 2 to
Char
+0x02c ApcStatelndex
Char
+0x02d ApcMode
UChar
+0x02e Inserted
+0xl9c SuspendSemaphore : struct _KSEMAPHORE, 2 elements, 0x14 bytes
: struct
DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10
+0x00 0 Header
b
ytes
UChar
+0x000 Type
UChar
+0x001 Absolute
UChar
+0x002 Size
UChar
+0x003 Inserted
Int4B
+0x004 SignalState
+0x008 WaitListHead
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
: Int4B
+0x010 Limit
+0xlb0 ThreadListEntry
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
i0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
+0xlb8 FreezeCount
Char
Char
+0xlb9 SuspendCount
+0xlba IdealProcessor
UChar
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: UChar
+Oxlbb DisableBoost
+OxlcO CreateTime
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 LowPart
: Uint4B
+0x004 HighPart
: Int4B
+0x000 u
: struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
+0x0Q4 HighPart
; Int4B
: Int8B
+0x000 QuadPart
+0xlc0 NestedFaultCount
Bitfield Pos 0, 2 Bits
+0xlc0 ApcNeeded
Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0xlc8 ExitTime
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
: struct
unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 u
: Uint4B
+0x000 LowPart
: Int4B
+0x004 HighPart
: Int8B
+0x000 QuadPart
S t r u c t _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0xlc8 LpcReplyChain
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0xlc8 KeyedWaitChain
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0xld0 ExitStatus
Int4B
Ptr32 to
+0xld0 OfsChain
+0xld4 PostBlockList
struct _ L I S T _ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr3 2 to
Ptr32 to
+0xldc TerminationPort
+ Oxide ReaperLink
Ptr32 to
Ptr32 to
+ Oxide KeyedWaitValue
Uint4B
+0xle0 ActiveTimerListLock
struct
LISTJENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0xle4 ActiveTimerListHead
Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
+0x004 Blink
Ptr32 to
+0xlec Cid
struct _CLIENT_ID, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 UniqueProcess
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 UniqueThread
struct _KSEMAPHORE, 2 elements
0x14 bytes
+0xlf4 LpcReplySemaphore
+0x000 Header
: struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10
byte
s
UChar
+0x000 Type
UChar
+0x001 Absolute
+0x002 Size
UChar
UChar
+0x003 Inserted
Int4B
+0x004 SignalState
+0x008 WaitListHead
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Ptr32 to
+0x010 Limit
Int4B
+0xlf4 KeyedWaitSemaphore
struct _KSEMAPHORE, 2 elements, 0x14 bytes
+0x000 Header
struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10
byte
i0x00 0
+0x001
+0x002
+0x003
+0x004

Type
Absolute
Size
Inserted
SignalState

UChar
UChar
UChar
UChar
Int4B
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: struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x008 WaitListHead
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
: Int4B
+0x010 Limit
+0x208 LpcReplyMessage
: Ptr32 to
+0x2 08 LpcWaitingOnPort : Ptr32 to
+0x20c Impersonationlnfo : Ptr32 to
+0x210 IrpList
: struct _ LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
: Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
+0x218 TopLevellrp
Uint4B
+0x21c DeviceToVerify
Ptr32 to
+0x220 ThreadsProcess
Ptr32 to
Ptr32 to
+0x224 StartAddress
+0x22 8 win32StartAddress : Ptr32 to
+0x228 LpcReceivedMessageld : Uint4B
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x22c ThreadListEntry
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Flink
Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink
struct _EX_RUNDOWN_REF, 2 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x234 RundownProtect
: Uint4B
+0x000 Count
: Ptr32 to
+0x000 Ptr
struct _EX_PUSH_LOCK, 5 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x23 8 ThreadLock
Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x000 Waiting
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x000 Exclusive
Bitfield Pos 2, 30 Bits
+0x000 Shared
Uint4B
+0x000 Value
Ptr32 to
+0x000 Ptr
+0x23c LpcReplyMessageld : Uint4B
Uint4B
+0x240 ReadClusterSize
Uint4B
+0x244 GrantedAccess
Uint4B
+0x24 8 CrossThreadFlags
Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x248 Terminated
+0x248 DeadThread
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0x24 8 HideFromDebugger
+0x248 Activelmpersonationlnfo : Bitfield Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x248 SystemThread
•: Bitfield Pos 4, 1 Bit
+0x248 HardErrorsAreDisabled : Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x24 8 BreakOnTermination : Bitfield Pos 6, 1 Bit
+0x248 SkipCreationMsg
: Bitfield Pos 7, 1 Bit
+0x248 SkipTerminationMsg : Bitfield Pos 8, 1 Bit
+0x24c SameThreadPassiveFlags : Uint4B
+0x24c ActiveExWorker
: Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x24c ExWorkerCanWaitUser : Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x24c MemoryMaker
: Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0x250 SameThreadApcFlags : Uint4B
+0x250 LpcReceivedMsgldValid : Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x250 LpcExitThreadCalled : Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x250 AddressSpaceOwner : Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0x254 ForwardClusterOnly : UChar
+0x255 DisablePageFaultClustering : UChar
kd;
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Appendix E: Decoding a Process Owner
One offset of an EPROCESS is the Access Token, which defines the security context for
the process. It is defined as (XP SP2):

dt TOKEN
+0x000 TokenSource
: _TOKEN_SOURCE
+0x010 Tokenld
: LUID
+0x018 Authentication^ : LUID
+0x020 ParentTokenld : LUID
+0x028 ExpirationTime : LARGE INTEGER
+0x030 TokenLock
: Ptr32 ERE SOURCE
+0x038 AuditPolicy
: _SEP_AUDIT_POLICY
+0x040 Modifiedld
: LUID
+0x048 Sessionld
: Uint4B
+0x04c UserAndGroupCount: Uint4B
+0x050 RestrictedSidCount: Uint4B
+0x054 PrivilegeCount : Uint4B
+0x058 VariableLength : Uint4B
+0x05c DynamicCharged : Uint4B
+0x060 DynamicAvailable : Uint4B
+0x064 DefaultOwnerlndex : Uint4B
+0x068 UserAndGroups : Ptr32 SID AND ATTRIBUTES
+0x06c RestrictedSids : Ptr32 SID A N D A T T R IB U T E S
+0x070 PrimaryGroup
: Ptr32 Void
+0x074 Privileges
: Ptr32 LUID AND ATTRIBUTES
+0x078 DynamicPart
: Ptr32 Uint4B
+0x07c DefaultDacl
: Ptr32 ACL
+0x080 TokenType
: TO K ENTYPE
+0x084 ImpersonationLevel : SECURITY IMPERSONATION LEVEL
+0x088 TokenFlags
: Uint4B
+0x08c TokenlnUse
: UChar
+0x090 ProxyData
: Ptr32 SECURIT Y_T O K EN PR O X Y_D AT A
+0x094 AuditData
: Ptr32 _SECURITY_TOKEN_AUDIT_DATA
+0x098 OriginatingLogonSession : LUID
+0x0a0 VariablePart : Uint4B

The UserAndGroups offset (0x068) is a pointer to an SID AND ATTRIBUTES
structure (again XP SP2):
dt _SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES
+0x000 Sid
: Ptr32 Void
+0x004 Attributes
: Uint4B
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So by tracing the chain of structures at the correct offsets, the SID (Security Identifier) of
the owner of the Process can be determined. It should be pointed out that the association
with the username can not readily be determined from memory only. The SID will have
to be compared with System registry or domain specific information (correlated with
information from the non-volatile stores).

The pointer to the Access Token is a virtual address and must be converted to a physical
address, this typically involves breaking the virtual address into it’s parts: 10 bits, Page
Directory Index, 10 bits Page Table Index, 12 bits Page Offset. (PDI, PTI and POFF
respectively)

The Page Directory Base(PDB) (another EPROCESS value) and the Page Directory
Index (PDI) multiplied by the page size (4) will yield the ID of the a Page Table Entry
(PTE1). The first 20 bits of PTE 1 are concatenated with the Page Table Index multiplied
by 4 to yield an ID to another Page Table Entry (PTE2). The first 20 bits of this Page
Table Entry can be concatenated with the Page Offsett to yield the physical address.
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Example:
AccessToken =
PDB
=

e3892033
06221000

(both obtained from EPROCESS)

(derived from the parts of AccessToken)
PDI
=
AccessToken / 0x400000
= 38e
PTI
=
AccessToken % 0x400000 / 0x1000 = 92
POFF
=
AccessToken % 0x1000
= 33
PTE 1 ID

=

PDB + PDI * 4

=6221e38

(value o f P T E 1 I D looked up in memory image)
PTE1

=

00831963

PTE2 ID

=

PTE1 - (PTE1 % 0x1000) + PTI * 4 = 831248

(value of PTE2 ID looked up in memory image)
PTE2

=

Physical Addr =

12319963
PTE2 - (PTE2 % 0x1000) + POFF = 12319033

Unfortunately, even though that the physical address o f the Access Token is now known,
obtaining the SID is still not a simple offset. Some variable length data fields are located
in the Access Token “above” the SID. Results from this project show that the SID begins
somewhere between 0x198 and 0xlD5 from this point, but this is from example, it is not
derived or calculated. Once the SID is located it must be decoded. The format, like
FileTime, is not straightforward.
A SID is typically seen to users and administrators as :
S-01-5-21-791032918-1291200457-768897840-500
However the same SID in it’s binary form appears as:
0105000000000005150000005634262FC927F64C3073D42DF4010000
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Table 5 : SID Encoding shows the meaning of the different parts of the SID and the types
of encoding used.

Table 5 : SID Encoding

SID
S-01

Encoded Part

5
21
791032918
1291200457
768897840
500

0x01
0x05
0x000000000005
0x 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
0x2 f2 63456
0x 4 c f 6 2 7 c 9
0x 2d d47 3 3 0
OxOOOOOlf4

Description
SID Revision
Number o f dashes - 2
NT Authority
NT Non Unique
Domain Issuer Part 1
Domain Issuer Part 2
Domain Issuer Part 3
User / Computer ID

Encoding
1 byte
1 byte
6 bytes, Big Endian
4 bytes, Little Endian
4 bytes, Little Endian
4 bytes, Little Endian
4 bytes, Little Endian
4 bytes, Little Endian

There are some well known SIDs and parts of SIDs:
S-l-1-0...
S-l-2-0...
S-l-3-0...
S-1-3-1...
_500 ‘
...501
...1000

Everyone
Locally Logged on
Creator Owner ID
Creator Group ID
Administrator Account
Guest Account
User Account
(1000 and higher... 1005 would indicated the 6th user)
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Appendix F: Offset Deltas by service pack.
This appendix is provided to enable a more reader friendly format of different offsets of
windows kernel structures. The offsets shown here (numeric values are hexadecimal) are
also available in the proof of concept source code listing in another appendix.

Table 6 : Windows Data Structure Offsets

EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
TH
TH
TH
TH
TH
TH
TH
TH

PageDirBase
processors
T Forward
T Back
priority
T Quantum
T Qant dis
exitStatus
createTime
exitTime
PID(client Unique)
WorkSetSize
WorkSetMin
WorkS etMax
AccessToken
PPID
name
size
size
createTime
exitTime
exitStatus
PID (client unique)
TID (client unique)
isTerminated
startAddr

2000
18
34
50
54
62
63
69
6c
88
90
9c
e4
e8
ec
12c
lc8
lfc
290
248
lbO
lb8
IcO
leO
le4
224
230

XP
18
34
50
54
62
63
69
24c
70
78
84
20c
210
214
0c8
14c
174
258
258
IcO
lc8
ldO
lec
lfO
248
224

XP SP 2
18
34
50
54
62
6f
69
ldO
70
78
84
20c
210
214
0c8
14c
174
260
258
IcO
lc8
ldO
lec
lfO
248
224

2003
18
34
50
54
62
63
69
24c
70
78
84
214
lf8
lfc
0c8
128
154
278
260
lc8
ldO
ld8
lf4
lf8
250
22c
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Appendix G: Proof of Concept Source Code Listing
The following PERL source will parse the contents of a memory image. On a 1.5 Mhz
Pentium 3m with 1 GB of RAM it currently takes about 30 minutes to parse a 1GB image
and 60 minutes to parse a 4 GB image. On a 2.66 Mhz Pentium 4 Xeon with 5 12MB
Ram, is takes about 20 minutes to parse a 1GB image and 60 minutes to parse a 4GB
image.
#!/usr/bin/perl
use strict;
use Getopt::Std;
use POSIX qw(strftime);
use Digest::MD5 qw(md5);
ttvariables that pertain more to this script than to the concept..
my $dump_header = 4096; # assuming size of dump file header - skipping
this is requied to decode virutaladdressess
my $isdump = 1 ;
# boolean if it is a dmp file - assume not
my $header_size =0;
# most fileswill have no header
my. $doprocess = 1 ;
# boolean to process processes
my $dothread = 0 ; # boolean to process threads
my $simple = 0 ;
# simple mode (task manager view)
my $showoffsets = 1 ;
# show offsets - more of a CS view than a CJ
view
my $isunique = 1 ; # use md5 to check for identical process structures
in memory, not really sure why you wouldn't want this
my $debug = 0;
#basically an output adjuster - mainly for
development
my $pThreshold =0;
#adjust a variance for how many tests can fail
for process checking
my $tThreshold =0;
# . .and for threads
my $version = "procloc 0.6";
my $OS = "2K ";
#Should be able to autodect this - or at least
command line option
my $output = 12; #basically bitmask for output, 1 = name, 2 = pid, 3 =
name+pid, 4 = priority, 5 = name+priority, etc
#"super globals" these variables are apparently the same for all
versions encountered today.
# but of course they may have to be broken down by OS at a later date,
my $kernelBound = 0x80000000; # all windows k e r n e l virtual addresses
are above 80000000 (except /3G systems)
my $pagesize = 4096; # size of a typical intel page
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my $memSegBound = 8; # from MS driver memory article, almost a speed
factor increase
#Six tips for efficient memory usage
#http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/driver/perform/memalloc.mspx
#my $SIZE0F_PROC = 0x2 90;
OS. . .
#my $SIZEOF_THRD = 0x248;

#actually i think these are different by

my $currentpos = 0;
my $count = 0;
#my $test;
my %uniqueprocs;
my %uniquethreads;
#The DISPATCH HEADER is the key to locating the different structures in
memory. This header is
#used by processes (the original goal of this project) as well as other
structures. The
#signature of these types change by OS version. These multiple hashes
are switched between...
#...it could be implemented as a hash of a hash, but that usually ends
up losing people...
# I changed it to one hash per OS...for DH, Proc, and Thread
info...maybe a multi hash is the way...
#DH header type, from Windows Internals, 2 005
#0 notification
#1 syncronizaiton
#2 mutant
#3 process
#4 queue
#5 semaphore
#6 thread
#8 notification timer
#9 sync timer
#This probably could be done with a single data structure, but hey...
my %win2K = (
#
DH_notification => "\x00.",
#
DH_notificationsize => "\x00.",
#
DH_sync => "\x01.",
#
DH_syncsize => "\x04.",
#
DH_mutant => "\x02.",
#
DH_mutantsize = > "\x00.",
DH_process => "\x03.",
DH_processsize => "\xlb.",
#
DH_queue => "\x04.",
#
DH_queuesize => "\x00.",
DH_semaphore => "\x05.",
DH_semaphoresize => "\x05.",
DH_thread => "\x06.",
DH_threadsize.=> "\x6c.",
DH_notificationtimer => "\x08.",
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#
#

DH_notificationtimersize => "\xOa.",
DH_synctimer => "\x.",
DH_synctimersize => "\x.",
EP_processors => 0x034,
EP_priority => 0x062,
EP_TH_Quantum => 0x63,
EP_TH_Quantum_Disable => 0x6 9,
EP_size = > 0x290,
EP paqeDirectoryBase => 0x018,
EP^tListFlink => 0x050,
EP_tListBlink => 0x054,
EP_exitStatus => 0x06c,
EP_createTime => 0x088,
EP_exitTime => 0x090,
EP_PID => 0x09c,
EP_AccessToken => 0x12c,
EP_AccessTokenSID =>0x188,
EP_PPID => 0xlc8,
EP_name => Oxlfc,
TH_size => 0x24 8,
TH_createTime => OxlbO,
TH_exitTime => 0xlb8,
TH_exitStatus => OxlcO,
TH_PID => OxleO,
TH_TID => 0xle4,
TH_isTerminated = > 0x224,
TH_tProcess => 0x22c,
TH_startAddr => 0x230,
EP_Win32P => 0x214,
EP_WorkingSetSize => 0x0e4,
EP_WorkingSetMin => 0x0e8,
EP_WorkingSetMax => OxOec,
EP_CommitChargeLimit => 0x2 68,
EP_CommitChargePeak => 0x26c,

) ;

my %winXP = (
#
DH_notification => "\x00.",
#
DH_notificationsize => "\x00.",
#
DH_sync => "\x01.",
#
DH_syncsize => "\x04.",
#
DH_mutant => "\x02.",
#
DH_mutantsize => "\x00.",
DH_process => "\x03.".,
DH_processsize => "\xlb.",
#
DH_queue => "\x04.",
#
DH_queuesize => "\x00.",
DH_semaphore => "\x05.",
DH_s emaphore size => "\x05.",
DH_thread => "\x0 6.",
DH_threadsize => "\x70.",
DH_notificationtimer => "\x08.",
DH_notificationtimersize => "\x0a.",
#
DH_synctimer => "\x.",
#
DH_synctimersize => "\x.",
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EP_size => 0x258,
EP_pageDirectoryBase => 0x018,
EP_tListFlink => 0x050,
EP_tListBlink => 0x054,
EP_exitStatus => 0x24c,
EP_createTime => 0x07 0,
EP_exitTime => 0x078,
EP_PID => 0x084,
EP_PPID => 0x14c,
EP_name = > 0x174,
TH_size => 0x258,
TH_createTime => OxlcO,
TH_exitTime => 0xlc8,
TH_exitStatus => OxldO,
TH_PID => Oxlec,
TH_TID => OxlfO,
TH_isTerminated => 0x24 8,
TH_tProcess => 0x220,
TH_startAddr => 0x224,
) ;

my %winXP2 = (
DH_notification => "\x00.",
DH_notif icationsize => 11\x00 .11,
DH_sync => "\x01.",
DH_syncsize = > "\x04.",
DH_mutant => "\x02.M,
DH_mutantsize => "\x00.",
DH process => "\x03.",
DH_processsize => "\xlb.",
DH_queue => "\x04.",
DH_queuesize = > "\x00.",
DH_semaphore => "\x05.",
DH_semaphoresize => "\x05.",
DH_thread => "\x06.M,
DH_threadsize => "\x7 0.",
DH_notificationtimer => "\x08.M,
DH_notificationtimersize => "\x0a.",
DH_synctimer => "\x.",
DH_synctimersize => "\x.",
EP_processors => 0x034,
EP_priority => 0x062,
EP_TH_Quantum => 0x6f,
EP_TH_Quantum_Disable => 0x6 9,
EP_size = > 0x260,
EP_pageDirectoryBase => 0x018,
EP_tListFlink = > 0x050,
EP_tListBlink => 0x054,
EP_AccessToken = > 0x0c8,
EP_createTime => 0x070,
EP_exitTime => 0x078,
EP_PID => 0x084,
EP_PPID => 0x14c,
EP_name => 0x174,
EP_exitStatus => 0x24c,
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TH_size => 0x258,
TH_createTime => OxlcO,
TH_exitTime => 0xlc8,
TH_exitStatus => OxldO,
TH_PID => Oxlec,
TH_TID => OxlfO,
TH_isTerminated => 0x248,
TH_tProcess => 0x220,
TH_startAddr => 0x224,
EP_Win32P => 0x130,
EP_CommitChargeLimit = > 0x08a,
EP_CommitChargePeak => OxOac,
EP_WorkingSetSize => 0x20C,
EP_WorkingSetMin => 0x210,
EP_WorkingSetMax => 0x214,
) ;

4fc

my %win2 003 = (
DH_notification => "\xOO.",
DH_notificationsize => "\x0 0.",
DH_sync => "\x01.",
DH_syncsize => "\x04.",
DH_mutant => "\x02.",
DH_mutantsize => "\x0 0.",
DH_process => "\x03.",
DH_processsize => "\xlb.",
DH_queue => "\x04.",
DH_queuesize => "\x00.",
DH_semaphore => "\x05.",
DH_s emaphore size => "\x05.",
DH_thread => "\x06.",
DH_threadsize => "\x72.",
DH_notificationtimer => "\x08.",
DH_notificationtimersize => "\x0a.",
DH_synctimer => "\x.",
DH_synctimersize => "\x.",
EP_size => 0x278,
EP_pageDirectoryBase => 0x018,
EP_tListFlink => 0x050,
EP_tListBlink => 0x054,
EP_exitStatus = > 0x24c,
EP_createTime => 0x070,
EP_exitTime => 0x078,
EP_PID => 0x084,
EP_PPID => 0x128,
EP_name => 0x154,
TH_size => 0x260,
TH_createTime = > 0xlc8,
TH_exitTime => OxldO,
TH_exirStatu3 => 0xld8,
TH_PID => Oxlf4,
TH_isTerminated => 0x2 50,
TH_tProcess => 0x228,
TH_startAddr => 0x22c,
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# command line options (see usage() for more info)
my %opts;
my $opt_string = 'svahtTpPuVd:O:0:';
getopts( "$opt_string", \%opts) or usage();
#i realize that a iot of this is somewhat redundant, but i haven't
decided on the default script operation yet
i f ($opt s{t }) { $dothread = 1;
if($opts{T}
$dothread = 0;
$doprocess = 1;
if ($opts{p }
i f ($opts{P}
$doprocess = 0;
if($opts{d}
print "User specified debug set to
$debug = $opts{d
$debug\n";
if ($opts{u}
print
"$version \n";usage(); exit(0); }
if ($opts{hj
print
"$version \n";usage(); exit(0); }
if($opts{v}
print
"$version \n"; }
$OS =
$opts{o}; print "Userspecified OS set to $OS\n";
if ($opts{oj

}

if ($opt s {s}) {
$ simple

= 1;

$dothread = 0;
$doprocess = 1;
$showoffsets = 0;
$output = 7;

}
i f ($opt s {v }) {
print

" v e r b o s e !";

$dothread = 1;
$doprocess = 1;
$debug = 10;
$showoffsets = 1;
$output = 32 767;
}

i f ($opts{a }){
print

"do al l \ n " ;

$dothread = 1;
$doprocess = 1;
$debug = 10;
$showoffsets = 1;
$ O U t p u t = 32 767;

}
if ($opts{O }){
$output = $opts{0};
print "user output set $output = ";
$output = unpack("B*", pack("N", $output));
print " $output\n";
}

my %OSoff;
OS

#placeholder hash for the correct offsets for a particular

if($OS eg "2K"){

%OSoff = %win2K;
}elsif($0S eq "XP"){
%OSoff = %winXP;
}elsif($0S eq "XP2"){
%OSoff = %winXP2;
}elsif($0S eq "2003"){
%OSoff = %win2 003;
}else{
print "unknown OS specified.\n";
usage();
exit(1);
}
#if it is a dmp file, skip the header...not even needed really, unles
the header is not
#a multiple of the segBound
if($isdump){
$header_size = $dump_header ,*
}
my $DH_SYNCRONIZATION_EVENT = "$OSoff{DH_sync}$OSoff{DH_syncsize}";
my $DH_PROCESS = "$OSoff{DH_process}$OSoff{DH_processsize}";
my $DH_SEMAPHORE = "$OSoff{DH_semaphore}$OSoff{DH_semaphoresize}";
my $DH_THREAD = "$OSoff{DH_thread}$OSoff{DH_threadsize}";
my $DH_NOTIFICATION_TIMER =
"$OSoff{DH_notificationtimer}$OSoff{DH_notificationtimersize}";
my $SIZEOF_PROC = $OSoff{EP_size};
my $SIZEOF_THRD = $OSoff{TH_size};

# get memory dump to parse
my $INFILE = shift;
i f (!($INFILE)){ usage();}
### ready

GO

open(INFILE, "<", $INFILE) or die "$0: unable to open $INFILE.";
binmode(INFILE);
if($isdump){
sysseek(INFILE, $dump_header, 0);

#skip header, if present

}

header();
#work through memory memSegBound at a time
my $sentinel;
my $test;
my $break = 0;
while (($sentinel = sysread(INFILE, $test, $memSegBound)) && $break =
0) {

88

$currentpos = sysseek(INFILE, 0, 1) ;
my $lpos = $currentpos - $pagesize;
#currently only processes and threads are tested, any DH type
could be implemented here though
if (substr($test, 0, 4) =~ /$DH_PROCESS/) {
if ($doprocess){
&ProcessTest ;

}

} elsif (substr($test, 0, 4) =~ /$DH__THREAD/) {
if ($dothread){
&ThreadTest ;
}
}

if($sentinel 1= $memSegBound){
if($debug > 1){
print "terminating condition found, sysread()
returned $sentinel, not $memSegBound";
}

$break=l; #annoying workaround due to "use strict" and
wanting the debug message...should be a better way
}

}
close(INFILE);
my $time = time() - $AT;
my $sec = $time % 60;
my $min = ($time - $sec) / 60;
print "\n Found $count structures in $min m $sec s\n" ,#the FILETIME format store 100ns increments since Jan 1, 1601 in 64
bits
#unix stores 1 second intervales since Jan 1, 1970
#to keep the program uniform one must be converted to the other
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

Filetime
FFFFFF0 0
00000001
00000010
00000000
00000000
00000000
00000000
00000000
00000000
00000000
00000000

conversions
00000000
000000 00
ooooo'ooo
01000000
10000000
00010000
00100000
00000100
00001000
00000001
00000010

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

under
under
about
about
about
about
about
about
about
about
about

1.5 seconds
1.5 seconds
26 seconds
7 :09
1 :51:31
1 day 6:32:31
21 days 8:40:18
11 months 22 days 18 :44 :57
14 years 3 months 10 months 11:59:22
22 8 years 5 months 5 days 23:50:03
6353 years 6 months 18 days 21:21:00

# Using this understanding, of the endian-ness and order of the bytes
the FILETIME representation of the Unix Epoch (Jan 1, 1970) is 000040d5
debl9d01.
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# Some of this understanding came from these websites
.# http://aspn.activestate.com/ASPN/Mai1/Message/perl-win32admin/1981214
#
http://www.koders.com/c/fidAB384423 820A5D2FBF7494 80D6615D03E554271C.asp
x
# Convert Win3 2 FILETIME to unix timestamp
sub Win2Unix4() {
my $Lval = shift;
my $Hval = shift;
my $Time = 0;
my $Shift = 11644473600; # win / unix epoch shift value obtained using
a FILETIME shift of the unix Epoch
if(($Lval == 0) and ($Hval ==0)){
return $Time;
}else{
$Time = int(($Hval * 2**32 / 10000000) + ($Lval / 10000000));
$Time -= $Shift;
}
if ($Time < 0){
$Time = 0;
}
return $Time;

}
#String Format timestamp to human readable form (descending
significance)
sub sPrintTimeO {
my $Time = shift;
my $Resuit;
my ($sec,$min,$hour,$mday,$mon,$year,$wday,$yday) =
gmtime($Time);
if ($Time ==0) {
$Result = 1';
} else {
$Result = strftime("%Y.%m.%d %H:%M:%S", $sec, $min, $hour,
$mday, $mon, $year, -1, -1, -1);
}
return $Result;
}
#print out the first line - the column headers
sub header() {
if($output )
"Cnt"); }
if($output % 10 == 1)
"Name"); }

{ printf(" %-3s",
{ printf(" %-16s",
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if($output / 10 % 10 == 1)

{

if($output / 100 % 10 == 1)

{

if($output / 1000 % 10 == 1)

{

"Typ") ; }
( TID) ");

"PID

}

"Pri") ;}
if($output
"WorkSet"); }
i f ($output
19s" , "Created");}
if($output
19s" , "Terminated");}
if($output
"Proc ");}
i f ($output
"Quan">;}
i f ($output
"QuaD") ; }
i f ($output
"Offset");}
i f ($output
10s" , "PDB" >;}
if ($output
10s"; "AToken");}
return;

/ 10000 % 10 == 1)

{

/ 100000 % 10 == 1)

{ printf("

/ 1000000 % 10 == 1)

{ printf("

/ 10000000 % 10 == 1)

{

/ 100000000 % 10 == 1)

{

/ 1000000000 % 10 == 1)

{

/ 10000000000 % 10 == 1) {
/ 100000000000 % 10 == 1)

{ printf("

/ 1000000000000 % 10 == 1)

{ printf("

}

#Test a potential processes
sub ProcessTest {
if($debug > 2){ print("Found process candidate at
$currentpos.\n");}
my $potentialp;
sysread(INFILE, $potentialp, $SIZEOF_PROC-$memSegBound,
$memSegBound);
# unpack (size , what) L = unsigned long, 1 = signed long, c *
ascii string, c = char, C = uchar
my $PageDirectoryBase
= unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialp,
$0Soff{EP_pageDirectoryBase}, 4));
my $ThreadListHeadFlink = unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_tListFlink}, 4));
my $ThreadListHeadBlink = unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_tListBlink}, 4));
my $ExitStatus
= unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_exitStatus}, 4));
my $CreateTime2
= unpack('h * 1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_createTime}, 8));
my $CreateTimeLo = unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_createTime}, 4));
my $CreateTimeHi = unpack(11 1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_createTime}+4, 4));

=
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= unpack('L' substr($potentialp,
my $ExitTimeLo
$OSoff{EP_exitTime}, 4));
= unpack('1' substr($potentialp,
my $ExitTimeHi
$OSoff{EP_exitTime}+4, 4));
= unpack('L' substr($potentialp,
my $PID
$OSoff{EPJPID}, 4));
= unpack(1c 1 substr($potentialp,
my $Priority
$OSoff{EP_priority}, 16));
= unpack(1c' substr($potentialp,
my $Quanturn
$OSoff{EP_TH_Quantum}, 16))
= unpack('C' substr($potentialp,
my $QuantumD
$OSoff{EP_TH_Quantum_Disabl<
16) ) ;
= unpack('L
substr($potentialp,
my $AcrProcs
$OSoff{EP_processors}, 4));
my $Win32P
= unpack('L ', substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_Win32P}, 4));
my $CommitIjim
= unpack ' L '
substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_CommitChargeLimit}, 4));
my $CommitPeak
= unpack 'L' substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_CommitChargePeak}, 4));
my $WorkingSetSize
= unpack 1L 1 substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_WorkingSetSize}, 4));
my $WorkingSetMin
= unpack 1L 1 substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_WorkingSetMin}, 4));
my $WorkingSetMax = unpack('L ', substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_WorkingSetMax}, 4));
my $AccessToken
= unpack(1L ', substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_AccessToken}, 4));
#these are all essentially
my $ATPDI
= $AccessToken /
my $ATPTI
= $AccessToken %
my $AT0FF
= $AccessToken %

bit masks
0x4 0000 0;
0x400000 /0x1000;
0x1000;

my $PTE1_ID = $PageDirectoryBase + ($ATPDI * 0x4);
if($debug > 1){
printf("PTE ID 0x%0.8x\n", $PTE1_ID);

}
my $temp;
#ok, this may get hairy...w e 're going to re-use the filehandle
and jump around decoding the virtual memory...
#this isn't quite working yet...
sysseek(INFILE, $PTE1_ID, 0);
sysread(INFILE, $temp, 4);
my $PTE1 = unpack('V', $temp);
i f ($debug > 1){ printf("PTE Val 0x%0.8x %s\n", $PTE1);}
$PTE1 = $PTE1 - $PTE1 % 0x1000;
my $PTE2_ID = $PTE1 + ($ATPTI * 0x4)-1;
#???
i f ($debug > 1){ printf("PTE2 ID 0x%0.8x %0.8x %0.8x \n",
$PTE2_ID, $PTE1, $ATPTI * 4);}
sysseek(INFILE, $PTE2_ID, 0);
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sysread(INFILE, $temp, 4);
my $PTE2 = unpack('V', $temp);
if($debug > 1){ printf("PTE2 Val 0x%0.8x %s\n", $PTE2);}
$PTE2 = $PTE2 - $PTE2 % 0x1000;
my $PageBaseAddress = $PTE2 + $ATOFF;
if($debug > 1){ printf("Page Base Addr %x \n",
$PageBaseAddress);}
my $useroffset = $PageBaseAddress + 0x198;
if($debug > 1){ printf ("uo %0.8x\n", $useroffset);}
sysseek(INFILE, $useroffset, 0) ;
sysread(INFILE, $temp, 28);
my $uSID = SIDbin2ascii($temp);
#done with the virutal memory part
#put the current spot in the file back so we can continue on with
the search
sysseek(INFILE, $currentpos+$SIZEOF_PROC-$memSegBound, 0);
my $PPID
= unpack('L ',
substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_PPID}, 4));
my $ImageFileName = unpack(1a * 1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_name}, 16) ) ;
my $CreateTime
= &Win2Unix4($CreateTimeLo, $CreateTimeHi);
my $ExitTime= &Win2Unix4($ExitTimeLo, $ExitTimeHi);
my $ptestcount=0;

#except for IDLE, a process must have a priority
if ($Priority ==0 && $PID !=0){
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: Process (other than
IDLE) has a priority of 0 (or lower).\n");}
}

#windows is supposed to have only 32 process levels...
#0 - Idle (system level), 1-15 'variable level', and 16-31 'real
time '
if ($Priority < 0 || $Priority >-31){
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: Process is out of
Priority Level Range (0-31).\n");}
}

#page directory must exist
if ($PageDirectoryBase ==0)
$ptestcount ++ ,-

{
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if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: PageDirectoryBase is
NULL.\n");}
}
# PDB has to start at a pageboundary.
if ($PageDirectoryBase % $pagesize != 0) {
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: PageDirectoryBase not
aligned on page boundary.\n");}
}
# all threads must be in the kernel virtual memory space
if ($ThreadListHeadFlink < $kernelBound) {
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: ThreadList Flink does
not point into kernel space.\n");}
}

if ($ThreadListHeadBlink < $kernelBound) {
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: ThreadList Blink does
not point into kernel space.\n");}
}

#Quantum is typically 2 clock intervals for xp / 2000 client and
12 for server platforms
#but for a variety of reasons it's actually stored at a multiple
of 3 (so 6 and 36 respectively).
if ($Priority ==0 && $PID !=0){
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: Process (other than
IDLE) has a priority of 0 (or lower).\n");}
^
}

#workinstsetmin
#workingsetmax

50/0

(system)

345 / 450 (idle)

#VADs
#access-token
#thread count - not implimented currently becuase this would
require caching all output until the end of the scan
# and this machine cannot handle this...
#check for minimum required procesess (sysinternals has written
about the minimal set)
#Check for default set of processes for heuristic
#check for maximum (i know there is a max in linux, there may be
in windows...)
#Check for sync events

if ($ptestcount > 0 + $pThreshold) {
if($debug > 2){ print("Test Failed: Not a process, failed
at $ptestcount");}
sysseek(INFILE, $currentpos+$memSegBound, 0) ;
return;
}

if ($isunique) {
#various reasons the same process might exist in mupltipl
locations
#tracking occurances of the same process might be
interesting, but not done at this point
my $hash = md5($potentialp);
$uniqueprocs{$hash}++;
if ($uniqueprocs{$hash} >1) {
#
print("Duplicate process detected
?X?X?!1!!!!!! 1!!!!!!!!!! J 11!!! !ll\n
######################################## A n " ) ;
if($debug > 2){ print("Duplicate process detected
■\n");}
return;
}
}

if($debug > 2){ print(" SUCCESS: Good proc found!An ");}
if($simple == 1){
print "D\n";
}else{
printf("\n%4d", ++$count);
{ printf(" %16s"
if ($output o
O.
$ImageFileName); }
{ printf(" % 3 s " ,
if($output / 10 % 10 == 1)
ii\> '. \/
{ printf(" % 4 d
if($output / 100 % 10 =- 1)

#
#
#

rH
II
II
O
rH

$PID); }

{
if($output / 1000 % 10 == 1)
$Priority);}
{
if($output / 10000 % 10 == 1)
$WorkingSetSize*($pagesiize/1024)) ;}
if($output / 100000 % 10 == 1)
&sPrintTime($CreateTime)) ;}
i f ($output / 1000000 % 10 == 1)
ScsPrintTime ($ExitTime) )
{
if($output / 10000000 % 10 == 1)
$AcrProcs);}
{
if($output / 100000000 % 10 == 1)
$Quantum);}
if($output / 1000000000 % 10 == 1) {
$QuantumD);}
if($output / 10000000000 % 10 == 1) {
$currentpos);}
if($output / 100000000000 % 10 == 1)
0x%0.8x", $PageDirectoryBase);}

printf(" %4d" ,
printf(» %15d"
{ printf("
{ printf("
printf(" % 4 s " ,
printf(" %4d" ,
printf(" %4d",
printf(" 0x%0.8x",
{ printf("
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if($output / 1000000000000 % 10 == 1)
0x%0.8x", $AccessToken);}

{ printf("

# test a potiential thread
sub ThreadTest() {
if($debug > 2){ print("Found thread candidate at $currentpos
\n")/}
my $potentialt;
sysread(INFILE, $potentialt, $SIZEOF_THRD-$memSegBound,
$memSegBound);
my $CreateTimeLo = unpack('L ', substr($potentialt,
$OSoff{TH_createTime}, 4) ) ;
my $CreateTimeHi = unpack('1', substr($potentialt,
$OSoff{TH_createTime}+4, 4));
my $ExitTimeLo
= unpack('L '
substr($potentialt,
$OSoff{TH_exitTime}, 4));
my $ExitTimeHi
= unpack('11
substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_exitTime}+4, 4));
my $ExitStatus
= unpack(1L 1
substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_exitStatus}, 4));
my $PID
= unpack(1L 1
substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_PID}, 4));
= unpack(1L '
my $TID
substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_PID}+4, 4))/
my $HasTerminated = unpack('L ', substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_isTerminated), 4));
my $ThreadsProcess
= unpack(1L ', substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_tProcess}, 4));
my $StartAddress = unpack('L ', substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_startAddr}, 4));
my $Win32StartAddress
= unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_startAddr}+4, 4))
my $ExitTime
= &Win2Unix4($ExitTimeLo, $ExitTimeHi);
my $CreateTime
= &Win2Unix4($CreateTimeLo,
$CreateTimeHi);
my $ttestcount = 0;
if (($ThreadsProcess < $kernelBound) && ($PID != 0)) {
$ttestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: ThreadsProcess not in
kernel space.\n");}
}

if (($StartAddress == 0) && ($PID != 0)) {
$ttestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: StartAddress is
NULL.\n");}
}

#thread priority base / current (if altered from base)

# extra checks on structures
if (substr ($potentialt, 0x0e8, 4) !~ /$DH_NOTIFICATION_TIMER/)
$ttestcount++;
i f ($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: No NOTIFICATION_TIMER
at 0x0e8.\n" )/}
}

if (substr($potentialt, 0x190, 4) !~ /$DH_SEMAPHORE/) {
$ttestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: No SEMAPHORE at
0x190.\n");}
}

if ((substr($potentialt, 0xle8, 4) !~ /$DH_SEMAPHORE/) && ($PID
1= 0 ))

{

$ttestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: No SEMAPHORE at
0xle8.\n");}

}
#determine if this one was a thread
if ($ttestcount > 0 + $tThreshold) {
if($debug > 2){ print(" FAILURE: bad thread,
skipping.\n");}
# . .if not, move to next test location and start the whole
process over
sysseek (INFILE, $currentpos+$memSegBound, 0) ,return;
}
#similar to process situation
if ($isunique) {
my $hash = md5($potentialt);
$uniquethreads{$hash}++;
if ($uniquethreads{$hash} >1) {
if($debug > 2){ print("Duplicate thread found.\n");
return;
}

}
if($debug > 2 ) { print(" SUCCESS: Found good thread!!.\n");}
printf("\n%4d", ++$count);
if ($output % 10 == 1)
{ printf(" %16s", " "

}
i f ($output / 10 % 10 == 1)
");

{ printf(" %3s", " T

}

if($output /
$PID,$TID); }
if($output /
if($output /

100 % 10 == 1)

{ printf(" % 4 d ( % 4 d ) " ,

1000 % 10 == 1)
10000 % 10 == 1)

{ printf(" %4d", " ")
{ printf(" % 1 5 d " , "

i f ($output / 100000 % 10 == 1)
&sPrintTime($CreateTime));}

{ printf(" %19s

") ; }
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i f ($output / 1000000 % 10 == 1)
&sPrintTime($ExitTime)) ;}
{
i f ($output / 10000000 % 10 == 1)
i f ($output / 100000000 % 10 == 1)
{
{
i f ($output / 1000000000 % 10 == 1)
i f ($output / 10000000000 % 10 == 1) {
$currentpos);}
i f ($output / 100000000000 % 10 == 1)
0x%0.8x", " ");}
i f ($output / 1000000000000 % 10 == 1)
0x%0.8x", " ");}

{ printf(" %19s /
If

printf("
printf("
printf("
printf("

%4s" , ii ii^ ;}
%4d", ii iij ;}
i^
%4d" , ii i
;}
0x%0.8x" ,

{ printf("
{ printf (11

}

#input is binary windows SID value
#output is human readable SID
#formula is defined at
http://blogs.msdn.com/oldnewthing/archive/2004/03/15/89753.aspx
#bytes format
#1
revision (S-l)
#1
number of dashes minus 2
#6
security big endian
#4
non unique little endian
#4
domain id little endian
#4
domain id little endian
#4
user/machine id little endian
#convert a binary SID to ASCII
sub SIDbin2ascii(){
my $SID = shift;
m y $sl =
m y $s2 =
m y $s3 =
m y $s4 =
m y $s5 =
m y $s6 =
m y $s7 =
m y $s8 =

unpack('H* ',
unpack('H* ',
unpack('H* ',
unpack('V' ,
unpack ( ' V ,
unpack (' V ' ,
unpack (' V ' ,
unpack(' V ' ,

substr($SID,
substr($SID,
substr($SID,
substr ($SID,
substr($SID,
substr ($SID,
substr ($SID,
substr($SID,

0, 1) )
1, 1) )
2, 6) )
8,
12,
16,
20,
24,

4)
4)
4)
4)
4)

)
)
)
)
)

return sprintf ("S-%s - % x - % s - % s - % s - %s - % s\n" ,
$s6, $s7, $s8) ;
}

sub usage(){
print<<END;
Procloc - Process Locator ($version)
2006 Tim Vidas
Locates processes and similar structures in an image of windows
memory obtianed either by crash dump or by dd-style acquisition.
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usage: ./procloc.pl [-hvdOj [—t|T] [-p|P]

[-f file]

-h / u
: this (help) message
-t
/ T
: show threads / do not
-p / P : show processes / do not
-o
: os selection (2K, XP, XP2, 2003)
-d
print debugging messages to stderr
file containing usersnames, one per line
-f file
-v
verbose output
-s
simple output
-a
"all output"
-0
: set output options:
1
name
2
type (p=process, t=thread)
4
pid (tid)
8
priority
16
Working Set
32
created
64
terminated
128
procs
2 56
quantum
512
quantumdelta
1024 offset
2048 PDB
4096 AccessToken
i.e. 1029 would be Name, PID, and offset
7 would be name, type, and PID
example: $0 -v -d -f file
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
by
the Free Software Foundation; version 2
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 0211013 01 USA
END
exit(0);
}
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Appendix H: Sample runs
Several different options are demonstrated to show the capabilities of the script and for
paper print formatting reasons. Sample runs were created on an IBM Thinkpad R52 (1.5
Mhz Pentium 3m w/ 1 GB RAM). The type of OS the image was aquired from can be
seen in the command line, all images are 512 MB in size.
C :\>procloc.pi -h
procloc 0.6
Procloc - Process Locator (procloc 0.6)
2006 Tim Vidas
Locates processes and similar structures in an image of windows
memory obtian
ed either by crash dump or by dd-style acquisition,
usage: ./procloc.pi [-hvdO] [-t|T] [-p|P] [-f file]
-h
-t
-P
-o
-d
-f
-v
-s
-a
-0

/ u
/ T
/ P
file

this (help) message
show threads / do not
show processes / do not
os selection (2K, XP, XP2, 2003)
print debugging messages to stderr
file containing usersnames, one per line
verbose output
simple output
"all output"
set output options:
1
name
2
type
4
pid (tid)
8
priority
16
Working Set
32
created
64
terminated
128
procs
quantum
256
512
quantumdelta
1024
offset
2048
PDB
4096
AccessToken
i.e. 1029 would be Name, PID, and offset
7 would be name, type, and PID

example: C:\procloc.pl -v -d -f file
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This program is free software; you, can redistribute it and/or
modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
by
the Free Software Foundation; version 2
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 0211013 01 USA

00
00
00

C :\>procloc.pi -O 31 f:\memory\2ksspO\MEMORY.DMP
user output set 31 = 00000000000000000000000000011111
Cnt Name
Typ PID ( TID) Pri WorkSet
1 Idle
P
0
16
0
P 1428
12
8
2 mdm.exe
3 mdm.exe
P
780
1920
8
P 1444
36
4 helix.exe
8 •
5 SOUNDMAN.EXE
P 1368
1288
8
12
6 cmd2k.exe
P 1340
8
P
664
7 explorer.exe
8
5600
P . 980
8076
8 nspm.exe
8
7412
9 inetinfo.exe
P
960
8
12
8
10 userinit.exe
P
228
3312
11 NSUM.exe
P 1060
8
12 dfssvc.exe
P
932
1212
8
P
3072
13 snmp.exe
8>
14 regsvc.exe
P
832
812
8
15 nvsvc32.exe
P
720
8
1008
P
692
2744
16 NSCM.exe
8
17 NSPMON.exe
P
668
1424
8
852
18 mstask.exe
P
8
1812
P
600
19 llssrv.exe
9
1748
2 0 svchost.exe
P
580
3316
8
21 msdtc.exe
P
476
8
3068
22 SPOOLSV.EXE
P
448
8
2896
424
2216
2 3 svchost.exe
P
8
24 rundll32.exe
P 1292
12
8
244
25 lsass.exe
P
13
4336
232
2 6 services.exe
P
10928
9
204
2 7 winlogon.exe
P
13
1828
184
1904
P
13
28 csrss.exe
160
2 9 smss.exe
P
11
344
3 0 System
P
8
212
8
Found 3 0 structures in 6 m 56 s C :\>procloc.pi -O 97 f:\memory\2ksspO\MEMORY.DMP
user output set 97 = 00000000000000000000000001100001
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Created
Cnt Name
1 Idle
2006 05 .24
2 mdm.exe
3 mdm.exe
2006 05 .24
4 helix.exe
2006 05 .24
5 SOUNDMAN.EXE
2006 05 .24
2006 05 .24
6 cmd2k.exe
2006 05 .24
7 explorer.exe
2006 05 .24
8 nspm.exe
9 inetinfo.exe
2006 05 .24
10 userinit.exe
2006 05 .24
2006 05 .24
11 NSUM.exe
2006 05 .24
12 dfssvc.exe
2006 05 .24
13 snmp.exe
2006 05 .24
14 regsvc.exe
15 nvsvc32.exe
2006 05 .24
2006 05 .24
16 NSCM.exe
2006 05 .24
17 NSPMON.exe
2006 05 .24
18 mstask.exe
19 llssrv.exe
2006 05 .24
2006 05 .24
2 0 svchost.exe
2006 05 .24
21 msdtc.exe
22 SPOOLSV.EXE
2006 05 .24
2006 05 .24
23 svchost.exe
2006 05 .24
24 rundll32.exe
2006 05 .24
25 lsass.exe
26 services.exe
2006 05 .24
2006 05 .24
27 winlogon.exe
2006 05 .24
28 csrss.exe
2006 05.24
29 smss.exe
30 System
Found 3 0 structures in 6 m 32 s

Terminated
23:26:42
23:44:45
23:29:44
23 :26:40
23:30:24
23 :26 :38
23 :21:32
23 :21:31
23:26:38
23 :21:33
23:21:31
23 :21:31
23:21:31
23 :21:28
23 :21:28
23 :21:27
23 :21:31
23:21:27
23:21:27
23:21:25
23 :21:25
23 :21:25
23:44:38
23:21:2 2
23:21:22
23 :21 :21
23 :21:20
23:21:17

2006.05.24 23:44:29
2006.05.24 23:44:33
2006.05.24 23:44:26

2006.05.24 23:27:01

2006.05.24 23:44:40

C :\>procloc.pi -O 8065 f:\memory\2ksspO\MEMORY.DMP
user output set 8065 = 0000000 000 000 00 000011111100 000 01
Proc Quan QuaD Offset
PDB
Cnt Name
1 Idle
1 127
0 0x00409b68 0x00030000
2 mdm.exe
0
0 0x01b07d68 0x0c2b6000
36
3 mdm.exe
0
36
0 0x01b08028 0xl0b4d000
4 helix.exe
0
0 0x0Ibl95a8 0xl059b000
36
0
0 0x01b22c28 OxObfC9000
5 SOUNDMAN.EXE
36
0
0 0x01b30628 0x0c814000
6 cmd2k.exe
36
7 explorer.exe
0
36
0 0x01ba7ae8 OxOblf4000
0
0 0x01be4a88 0x08b2d000
8 nspm.exe
36
0
0 0x01beb7e8 0x08b36000
36
9 inetinfo.exe
0
0 OxOlbfa02 8 0x0b41f000
10 userinit.exe
36
0
36
0 0x01c80948 0x08f50000
11 NSUM.exe
0
0 0x01c83c88 0x086e0000
12 dfssvc.exe
36
0
36
0 0x01c8ad68 0x086cc000
13 snmp.exe
14 regsvc.exe
0
36
0 0x01ce36c8 0x0840b000
0
36
0 0x01cec028 0x07172000
15 nvsvc32.exe
0
0 OxOlcf6428 0x06e6d000
16 NSCM.exe
36
17 NSPMON.exe
0
0 OxOlcf94c8 0x071dd000
36
0
36
0 OxOlcfela8 0x08360000
18 mstask.exe

AToken
0xel001770
0x00000000
Oxelf5c9b0
OxelfOf8b0
Oxelf0e250
0x00000000
Oxelcfe5d0
0xele80870
0xele7ad30
0xele6b2b0
0xelcd803 0
0xele30330
0xele2b6d0
0xeld63cf0
0xelc5ecf0
0xelcc6bf0
0xelcbfd50
0xeld71db0
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0
19 llssrv.exe
36
20 svchost.exe
0
36
21 msdtc.exe
0
36
22 SPOOLSV.EXE
0
36
23 svchost.exe
0
36
24 rundll32.exe
0
36
25 Isass.exe
0
36
26 services.exe
0
36
27 winlogon.exe
0
36
28 csrss.exe
0
36
29 smss.exe
0
36
0
36
30 System
Found 3 0 structures in 6 m 42 s

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0x01dlb028
OxOldlf888
0x01d35928
0x01d3a848
0x01d46508
0x01d5f708
0x01d6cca8
0x01d6e948
0x01d7eca8
0x01el402 8
0x01e31408
0x020449e8

0x068ba000
0x06c2e000
0x06626000
0x064al000
0x06547000
0xla87b000
0x05b2a0 00
0x05a5a000
0x05883000
0x04bfeOOO
0x03b3a000
0x00030000

C:\ >procloc.pl -o XP2 -s f:\memory\xpsp2\xpsp2.dd
User specified OS set to XP2
Cnt Name
Typ PID
1 Idle
P
0
2 rundll32.exe
P 1124
P
836
3 helix.exe
4 SOUNDMAN.EXE
P 1224
5 msmsgs.exe
P 1340
P
608
6 alg.exe
204
7 nvsvc32.exe
P
8 regedit.exe
P 1964
P 1892
9 spoolsv.exe
10 svchost.exe
P 1420
11 svchost.exe
P 1552
12 svchost.exe
P 1676
P 1172
13 svchost.exe
14 svchost.exe
P 1108
920
15 lsass.exe
P
P
908
16 services.exe
17 wscntfy.exe
P
736
832
• 18 csrss.exe
P
P 1068
19 explorer.exe
20 wuauclt.exe
P 1584
21 winlogon.exe
P
864
22 smss.exe
P
776
23 System
P
4
Found 2 3 structures in 6 m 58 s
C :\>procloc.pi -t -0 1031 f:\memory\2kssp3\MEMORY.DMP
user output set 1031 = 00000000000000000000010000000111
Typ PID ( TID) Offset
Cnt Name
P
0
0x0040d5e8
1 Idle
2
T
0(
0) 0x0040d878
T
936( 524) 0x01712ca8
3
4
T 1764( 336) 0x017e7da8
5
T
284 (1384) 0x0182d488
6
T
924(1572) 0x0182e988
7
T
596(1520) 0x0182fda8
8
T 1684(1768) 0x01832028
9
T
596(1748) 0x01833788

0xelc7b250
0xelc75el0
0xelc6c750
0xelc675f0
0xelc62270
0x00000000
0xelcl6030
0xelcl3 910
0xelb45590
Oxelaef3b0
0xel401el0
OxelO 0177 0
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10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

SOUNDMAN,EXE

wuauc11 .exe

rundll32.exe

dd.exe
helix.exe

T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
P
T
T
T
P
T
T
T
P
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
P
T
P
T

1684
1684
596
596
244
1516
244
244
1516
232
1516
1612
1612
1516
1516
1516
284
1516
1516
1516
1364
1516
184
1672
1672
1684
1684
1516
596
284
1684
1516
496
992
948
436
704
1464
1764
1764
8

P
T
T
T
T
T
P
T
T
T

232
180
184
184
184
180
180
184
184
184

1692)
1688)
1704)
1652)
1640)
1616)
1628)
1348)
1636)
1632)
1624)
1608)
1604)
1600)
1596)
1096)
1568)
1592)
1564)
644)
1760)
1756)
1732)
1696)
1556)
1664)
1392)
1680)
480)
1588)
1668)
280)
880)
372)
1776)
1228)

0x018359c8
0x01835da8
0x0183 9da8
0x0183a4e8
0x0183bda8
0x0183e4e8
0x0183f0e8
0x01853148
0x018538c8
0x01857848
0x0185b028
0x01864508
0x01864 7c8
0x01864a88
0x01864d08
0x01866428
0x0186a928
0x0186b728
0x0186d748
0x0186e9c8
0x0186flc8
0x018702e8
0x0187e028
0x01898028
0x01898b28
0x018a7028
0x018a8da8
0x018aa028
0x018ab028
0x018b0988
0x018b4028
0x018b5028
0x018b8028
0x018b83a8
0x018b8628
0x018b88a8
0x018b8da8
0x018ba028
0x018cfda8
0x018d0028
0x018dlaa8

<trimmed for brevity>
351 SERVICES.EXE
352
353
354
355
356
357 WINLOGON.EXE
358
359
360

OxOlacfac8
0x01ad0808
0x0lad2028
0x01ad2a48
UxUladc2 88
OxOladf8e8
OxOladfb68
( 200) 0x01ae0308
( 196) 0x01ae0608
( 192) 0x01ae0a28

(
(
(
(
(

220)
208)
212)
2U4)
148 )
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T
-361
P
362 CSRSS.EXE
T
363
T
364
T
365
P
366 SMSS.EXE
T
367
T
368
T
369
T
370
T
371
T
372
T
373
T
374
T
375
T
376
T
377
T
378
T
379
T
380
T
381
T
382
T
383
T
384
T
385
T
386
T
387
T
388
T
389
T
390
T
391
T
392
T
393
T
3 94
T
3 95
T
396
T
397
T
398
T
399
T
400
T
401
T
402
P
403 System
T
404
Found 4 04 structures in 6
C:\>

184 (
184
160 (
160 (
160 (
160
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
160 (
160 (
160 (
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8(
8
8(
m 26

188) 0x01ae22e8
0x01b960c8
176) 0x01b96548
172) 0x01b96888
112) 0x01b96b28
0x01bb3328
152) 0x01bb36e8
132) 0x0lbb4028
144) 0x01bb4b2 8
140) 0x01bb4da8
136) 0x01bb7 088
156) 0x01bba028
168) 0x01bba9c8
164) 0x01bbac68
128) 0x01c0ble8
124) 0x01cl8 0e8
120) 0x01cl836 8
108) OxOlfel408
104) OxOlfe7588
100) 0x02035028
92) 0x02 03b02 8
76) 0x0203f028
88) 0x0203f328
84) 0x0203fb28
80) 0x0203fda8
72) 0x02 0402e8
60) 0x02041028
68) 0x02041b28
64) 0x02041da8
36) 0x02042028
56) 0x02 042 3a8
52) 0x02042628
48) 0x020428a8
44) 0x02042b28
40) 0x02042da8
12) 0x02043028
32) 0x020433a8
28) 0x02043628
24) 0x020438a8
20) 0x02043b28
16) 0x02043da8
4) 0x02044768
0x020449e8
96) 0x020596e8
s
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Appendix I: Linux Acquisition
Kcore exists in the /proc filesystem, it is essentially a virtual view of physical RAM.
Kcore might be the preferred way to image memory in Linux because shows memory in a
structured way: ELF format. Supposedly kcore is only 4kb larger than Physical RAM,
experiments done as part of this project show that there may actually be larger difference
in file size. Different distributions implement kcore differently and Kernel Development
lists have even long considered removing kcore altogether (/proc/kcore May Be Going
Away, 2003), so it’s long term reliability may be questionable.

You can enumerate the file type of kcore with the file command, and creating an image
of RAM is as simple as using the dd command:

$>file /proc/kcore
/proc/kcore: ELF 32-bit LSB core file Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV),
SVR4-style, SVR4-style, from 'vmlinux'
$>dccidd < /proc/kcore | <something to receive the memory - netcat?>

Redhat (and possibly other distributions) does not support reading kcore. To re-enable
this feature, you have to uncomment the lines that limits its usage - basically restoring
the functionality that exists in the non-Redhat-modified Linux kernel.

Savekore is available in unix and variants like Solaris, but not typically in Linux. To
approximate some of the functionality presented earlier for Windows, there are several
additions or modifications that can be performed to Linux systems. There is an Open
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Source (sourceforge) project called Linux Kernel Crash Dump (LKCD), that requires
kernel patching (pre-incident). Mission Critical Linux has a patch called MCore. Redhat
Advanced Server 2.1+ (Enterprise Level - pay product) offers some tools like Netdump
and Crash. Rational and implementation notes are available online (Johnson, 2002).

/dev/mem and /dev/kmem may very well be implemented in a more standard way, but are
also more “dangerous” to use as they are essentially devices. Similar to kcore, Redhat
(and possibly others) restricts access, basically only allowing access to the first 1 MB.

Analysis
The methodology is similar to the proof on concept for Windows RAM dumps, with
Linux the EPROCESS similar structure is task_struct, task structs are doubly linked,
pages are the same: 4096 bytes, and there is a kernel / user bound (though the bound is
1GB / 3GB, so similar to the /3GB Windows boot switch so the boundary would be
OxcOOOOOOO instead of 0x80000000).

Gdb is an Open Source debugger provided with many distributions of Linux. Symbols
are available in Linux and, just as in windows, can aide in debugging binaries by helping
associate function names, variable names and similar. Unlike Windows, in Linux
symbols are a plain text file typically called System.map found in /boot/.

33 If stability is not an issue (ie you are about to ‘pull the plug’ anyway) an attempt at copying /dev/mem
should be attempted. All tests, albeit not extensive, performed as research for this project showed no
stability issues with using /dev/mem as input for dd.
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The init task symbol can be found with:
$> cat /boot/System.map | grep in itta sk
c0479b2c r ksymtab init task
c047ef28 r kstrtab init task
c048cba0 D init task
The line of interest it is the one with the “D”
Similar to how the offsets for parts of an EFROCESS structure were located for windows
using the structure output from a windows debugger (Appendixes B-D), the Linux kernel
source can be inspected to located similar part of the process structure in Linux.

The template for a task structure can be found in sched.h(about 1100 lines of code):
$>cat /usr/src/linux-KERNELVERSION/include/sched.h
A sample task struct listing from a 2.6.10 kernel can be found at the end of this
Appendix. It is easy to see the similarity to the EPROCESS structure (related to the goals
of this paper anyway).

Converting a Virtual Address to a Physical Address actually requires more steps than in
Windows. Each task has a memory map struct, keeping track of virtual memory area ,
structs. In Virtual Memory, there is a virtual file which has a pointer to a dentry which
has a pointer to an inode which has a mapping into address space. This address space
actually tracks page descriptors.
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Research done during the creation o f this text revealed that Mariusz Burdach actually has
already created documentation similar to what has been proposed for Linux. Rather than
replicate his work here, a citation is given to his work and it is up to the reader to study
his work at their leisure. (Burdach, 2004).
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Linux Task Structure (from sched.h kernel 2.6.10)

struct task_struct {
volatile long state;
/* -1 unrunnable, 0 runnable, >0 stopped */
struct thread_info *thread_info;
atomic_t usage;
unsigned long flags;
/* per process flags, defined below */
unsigned long ptrace;
int lock_depth;

' /* Lock depth */

int prio, static_prio;
struct list_head run_list;
prio_array_t *array,unsigned long sleep_avg;
long interactive_credit;
unsigned long long timestamp,
int activated;
unsigned long policy;
cpumask_t cpus_allowed;
unsigned int time_slice,

last_ran;

first_time_slice;

#ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
struct sched_info sched_info;
#endif
struct list_head tasks;
/*

* ptrace_list/ptrace_children forms the list of my children
* that were stolen by a ptracer.
*/

struct list_head ptrace_children;
struct list_head ptrace_list;
struct mm_struct *mm,

*active_mm;

/* task state */
struct linux_binfmt *binfmt;
long exit_state;
int exit_code, exit_signal;
int pdea t h _ s i g n a l ; /* The signal sent when the parent dies
/ * ???

*/

*/

unsigned long personality;
unsigned d i d _ e x e c :1;
pid_t pid;
pid_t tgid;
/*

* pointers to (original) parent process, youngest child, younger sibling,
* older sibling, respectively.
(p->father can be replaced with
* p->parent->pid)
*/

struct
struct

task_struct *real_parent;/* real parent process (when being debugged)
task_struct *parent;
/* parent process */

/*

* children/sibling forms the list of my children plus the
* tasks I'm ptracing.
*/

struct list_head children;
/* list of my children *,/
struct list_head sibling;
/* linkage in my parent's children list
struct task_struct *group_leader;
/* threadgroup leader */
/* PID/PID hash table linkage.

*/

*/

*/
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struct pid pids[PIDTYPE_MAX];
wait_queue_head_t wait_ch l d e x i t ;
struct completion *vfork_done;
int
user *set_child_tid;
int
user *clear_child_tid;

/* for wait4 () */
/* for vfork() */
/* CLONE_CHILD_SETTID */
/* CL0NE_CHILD_CLEARTID */

unsigned long rt_priority;
unsigned long it_real_value, it_prof_value, it_virt_value;
unsigned long it_real_incr, it__prof_incr, it_virt_incr;
struct timer_list real_timer;
unsigned long utime, stime;
unsigned long nvcsw, nivcsw; /* context
switch counts */
struct timespec start_time;
/* mm fault and swap info: this can arguably be seen as either mm-specific or threadspecific */
unsigned long min_flt, maj_flt;
/* process credentials */
uid_t uid,euid,suid,fsuid;
gid_t gid,egid,sgid,fsgid;
struct group_info *group_info;
kernel_cap_t
cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted;
unsigned keep_capabilities:1,struct user_struct *user;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct key
*session_keyring; /* keyring inherited over fork */
struct key
*process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process {CLONE_THREAD) */
struct key
*thread_keyring; /* keyring private to this thread */
#endif
unsigned short used_math;
char c o m m [16];
/* file system info */
int link_count, total_link_count;
/* ipc stuff */
struct sysv_sem sysvsem;
/* CPU-specific state of this task */
struct thread_struct thread;
/* filesystem information */
struct fs_struct *fs;
/* open file information */
struct files_struct *files;
/* namespace */
struct namespace *namespace;
/* signal handlers */
struct signal_struct *signal;
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
sigset_t blocked, real_blocked;
struct sigpending pending;
unsigned long sas_ss_sp;
size_t sas_ss_size;
int (*notifier)(void * p r i v ) ;
void *notifier_data
sigset_t *notifier__mask;
void *security;
struct audit_context *audit_context;
/* Thread group tracking */
u32 parent_exec_id;
u32 self_exec_id;
/* Protection of (de-)all o c a t i o n : mm, files, fs, tty, keyrings */
spinlock_t alloc_lock;
/* Protection of proc_dentry: nesting proc_lock, dcache_lock,
w r i t e _ l o c k _ i r q (&tasklist_lock); */
spinlock_t proc_lock;
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/* context-switch lock */
spinlock_t switch_lock;
/* journalling filesystem info */
void *journal_info;
/* VM state */
struct reclaim_state *reclaim_state;
struct dentry *proc_dentry
struct backing_dev_info *backing_dev_info;
struct io_context *io_context;
unsigned long ptrace_message;
siginfo_t *last_siginfo; /* For ptrace use.

*/

/*

*
*
*
*

current io wait handle: wait
If this thread is processing
inside the currently handled
to a stack based synchronous

queue entry to use for io waits
aio, this points at the waitqueue
kiocb. It may be NULL (i.e. default
wait) if its doing sync 10.

*/

wait_queue_t *io_wait;
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
struct mempolicy *mempolicy;
short il_next;
/* could be shared with used_math */
#endif
};
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Appendix J: GNU General Public License
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 2, June 1991
Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation,
51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston,

Inc.
MA 02110-1301

USA

Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
Preamble
The licenses for most software are designed to take away your
freedom to share and change it. By contrast, the GNU General Public
License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change free
software--to make sure the software is free for all its users. This
General Public License applies to most of the Free Software
Foundation's software and to any other program whose'authors commit to
using it.
(Some other Free Software Foundation software is covered by
the GNU Library General Public License instead.) You can apply it to
your programs, too.
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you
have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for
this service if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it
if you want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it
in new free programs; and that you know you can do these things.
To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid
anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights.
These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for you if you
distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it.
For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether
gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that
you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the
source code. And you must show them these terms so they know their
rights.
We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software,
and
(2) offer you this license which gives you legal permission to copy,
distribute and/or modify the software.
Also, for each author's protection and ours, we want to make certain
that everyone understands that there is no warranty for this free
software. If the software is modified by someone else and passed on,
we want its recipients to know that what they have is not the original,
so

113

that any problems introduced by others will not reflect on the original
authors' reputations.
Finally, any free program is threatened constantly by software
patents. We wish to avoid the danger that redistributors of a free
program will individually obtain patent licenses, in effect making the
program proprietary. To prevent this, we have made it clear that any
patent must be licensed for everyone's free use or not licensed at all.
The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
modification follow.
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
0. This License applies to any program or other work which contains
a notice placed by the copyright holder saying it may be distributed
under the terms of this General Public License. The "Program", below,
refers to any such program or work, and a "work based on the Program"
means either the Program or any derivative work under copyright law:
that is to say, a work containing the Program or a portion of it,
either verbatim or with modifications and/or translated into another
language.
(Hereinafter, translation is included without limitation in
the term "modification".) Each licensee is addressed as "you".
Activities other than copying, distribution and modification are not
covered by this License; they are outside its scope. The act of
running the Program is not restricted, and the output from the Program
is covered only if its contents constitute a work based on the
Program (independent of having been made by running the Program).
Whether that is true depends on what the Program does.
1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's
source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you
conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate
copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty; keep intact all the
notices that refer to this License and to the absence o f .any warranty;
and give any other recipients of the Program a copy of this License
along with the Program.
You may charge a fee for the physical act of transferring a copy, and
you may at your option offer warranty protection in exchange for a fee.
2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any portion
of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and
distribute such modifications or work under the terms of Section 1
above, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:
a) You must cause the modified files to carry prominent notices
stating that you changed the files and the date of any change.
b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in
whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any
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part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third
parties under the terms of this License.
c) If the modified program normally reads commands interactively
when run, you must cause it, when started running for such
interactive use in the most ordinary way, to print dr display an
announcement including an appropriate copyright notice and a
notice that there is no warranty (or else, saying that you provide
a warranty) and that users may redistribute the program under
these conditions, and telling the user how to view a copy of this
License.
(Exception: if the Program itself is interactive but
does not normally print such an announcement, your work based on
the Program is not required to print an announcement.)
These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole.
If
identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the Program,
and can be reasonably considered independent and separate works in
themselves, then this License, and its terms, do not apply to those
sections when you distribute them as separate works. But when you
distribute the same sections as part of a whole which is a work based
on the Program, the distribution of the whole must be on the terms of
this License, whose permissions for other licensees extend to the
entire whole, and thus to each and every part regardless of who wrote
it.
Thus, it is not the intent of this section to claim rights or contest
your rights to work written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to
exercise the right to control the distribution of derivative or
collective works based on the Program.
In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program
with the Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of
a storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under
the scope of this License.
3.
You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it,
under Section 2) in object code or executable form under the terms of
Sections 1 and 2 above provided that you also do one of the following:
a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable
source code, which must be distributed under the terms of Sections
1 and 2 above on a medium customarily used for software
interchange; or,
b) Accompany it with a written offer, valid for at least three
years, to give any third party, for a charge no more than your
cost of physically performing source distribution, a complete
machine-readable copy of the corresponding source code, to be
distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium
customarily used for software interchange; or,
c) Accompany it with the information you received as to the offer
to distribute corresponding source code.
(This alternative is
allowed only for noncommercial distribution and only if you
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received the program in object code or executable form with such
an offer, in accord with Subsection b above.)
The source code for a work means the preferred form of the work for
making modifications to it. For an executable work, complete source
code means all the source code for all modules it contains, plus anyassociated interface definition files, plus the scripts used to
control compilation and installation of the executable. However, as a
special exception, the source code distributed need not include
anything that is normally distributed (in either source or binary
form) with the major components (compiler, kernel, and so on) of the
operating system on which the executable runs, unless that component
itself accompanies the executable.
If distribution of executable or object code is made by offering
access to copy from a designated place, then offering equivalent
access to copy the source code from the same place counts as
distribution of the source code,' even though third parties are not
compelled to copy the source along with the object code.
4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Program
except as expressly provided under this License. Any attempt
otherwise to copy, modify, sublicense or distribute the Program is
void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License.
However, parties who have received copies, or rights, from you under
this License will not have their licenses terminated so long as such
parties remain in full compliance.
5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not
signed it. However, nothing else grants you permission to modify or
distribute the Program or its derivative works. These actions are
prohibited by law if you do not accept this License. Therefore, by
modifying or distributing the Program (or any work based on the
Program), you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so, and
all its terms and conditions for copying, distributing or modifying
the Program or works based on it.
6. Each time you redistribute the Program (or any work based on the
Program), the recipient automatically receives a license from the
original licensor to copy, distribute or modify the Program subject to
these terms and conditions. You may not impose any further
restrictions on the recipients’ exercise of the rights grantedherein.
You are not responsible for enforcing compliance by third parties to
this License.
7. If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent
infringement or for any other reason (not limited to patent issues),
conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order, agreement or
otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not
excuse you from the conditions of this License.
If you cannot
distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this
License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you
may not distribute the Program at all. For example, if a patent
license would not permit royalty-free redistribution of the Program by
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all those who receive copies directly or indirectly through you, then
the only way you could satisfy both it and this License would be to
refrain entirely from distribution of the Program.
If any portion of this section is held invalid or unenforceable under
any particular circumstance, the balance of the section is intended to
apply and the section as a whole is intended to apply in other
circumstances.
It is not the purpose of this section to induce you to infringe any
patents or other property right claims or to contest validity of any
such claims; this section has the sole purpose of protecting the
integrity of the free software distribution system, which is
implemented by public license practices. Many people have made
generous contributions to the wide range of software distributed
through that system in reliance on consistent application of that
system; it is up to the author/donor to decide if he or she is willing
to distribute software through any other system and a licensee cannot
impose that choice.
This section is intended to make thoroughly clear what is believed to
be a consequence of the rest of this License.
8. If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in
certain countries either by patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the
original copyright holder who places the Program under this License
may add an explicit geographical distribution limitation excluding
those countries, so that distribution is permitted only in or among
countries not thus excluded.
In such case, this License incorporates
the limitation as if written in the body of this License.
9. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new
versions of the General Public License from time to time. Such new
versions will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may
differ in detail to address new problems or concerns.
Each version is given a distinguishing version number.
If the Program
specifies a version number of this License which applies to it and "any
later version", you have the option of following the terms and
conditions either of that version or of any later version published by
the Free Software Foundation.
If the Program does not specify a
version number of this License, you may choose any version ever
published by the Free Software Foundation.
10. If you wish to incorporate parts of the Program into other free
programs whose distribution conditions are different, write to the
author to ask for permission.
For software which is copyrighted by the
Free
Software Foundation, write to the Free Software Foundation; we
sometimes make exceptions for this. Our decision will be guided by the
two goals of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free
software and of promoting the sharing and reuse of software generally.
NO WARRANTY
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11. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO
WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.
EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR
OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS
WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF
ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
12. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN
WRITING
WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY.WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR
DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM
(INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED
INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF
THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR
OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
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